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Résumé
Le présent mémoire a pour objet les formes, les caractéristiques et les défis de la
gouvernance des déchets électroniques. L’auteure explore les impactes socio-
économiques et environnementales de divers types d’instruments conçus pour mitiger les
risques à la santé humaine et à l’environnement que présentent les produits électroniques
en fin de vie, notamment:  les traités multilatéraux qui visent à prohiber le transfert des
déchets hasardeux au pays en développement, les législations régionales, nationales et
provinciales mettant en vigueur des systèmes de recyclage obligatoire des déchets
électroniques, ainsi que d’autres initiatives, publics et privées, basées sur le principe de la
responsabilité élargie des producteurs (REP). L’objectif de ce travail est de comprendre
comment les acteurs impliqués dans le commerce de l’équipement électronique peuvent
modeler les systèmes de production, d’usage et du traitement fin de vie des technologies
contemporaines pour que ces dernières puissent continuer à faire élever les standards de
vie et à avancer le développement des communautés humaines, en respectant
simultanément le principe international de l’équité globale, l’environnement naturel et la
qualité de vie des générations futures.
Mots-clés: déchets électroniques, produit électronique en fin de vie, Convention de Bâle,
responsabilité élargie des producteurs (REP), approche cycle de vie, production durable
Abstract
This thesis addresses the forms, characteristics and challenges of electronic waste
governance. The author explores the socio-economic and environmental impacts of a
diverse range of instruments that have been developed to mitigate the human health and
environmental risks presented by end-of-life electronic equipment, namely: multilateral
treaties restricting e-waste trade flows into developing countries, regional, national and
provincial legislations imposing mandatory recycling systems for e-waste, as well as
other public and private initiatives based on the principle of extended producer
responsibility (EPR). The objective of this study is to understand how stakeholders
implicated in the electronic equipment sector can model the systems of production, use,
and discard of electronics, so that the latter may continue to raise living standards and
propel human development while simultaneously respecting the international principle of
global equity, the natural environment and the quality of life of future generations.
Key words: electronic wastes, end-of-life electronic equipment, Basel Convention,
extended producer responsibility (EPR), lifecycle thinking, sustainable production
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5INTRODUCTION
The Dilemma
Technology today pervades all spheres of modern life, facilitating transnational
communication, strengthening global social and economic development, and perpetually
enhancing human experience, efficiency and expectations. At the same time, from our
contemporary unbounded use of the microchip, have emerged new environmental and
human health concerns. The unprecedented and rising global demand for newly
developed electronic products,1 has swiftly become a major threat to the environment,
contributing to the depletion of natural resources and generating massive, uncontrolled
quantities of toxic waste.
Although worldwide consumer preference for cutting-edge electronic commodities
certainly signifies that living standards are rising across frontiers, it simultaneously
reflects the modern dilemma of electrical and electronic waste (also referred to a e-waste
or WEEE2), which has become the fastest growing waste stream of the 21st century.3 The
seemingly endless rise of e-waste is problematic from environmental and human health
perspectives, as electronic devices contain numerous toxic substances and materials
which are known to cause severe pollution upon disposal. In particular, e-waste poses an
                                                 
1 For revenue estimates and forecasts for the global electronic equipment industry, see Décision
Études Conseil, World Electronics Industries 2008 – 2013 (Paris, DEC, April 2009).
2 Waste electrical and electronic equipment.
3 United Nations Environment Program, “E-waste, the hidden side of IT equipments
manufacturing and use”, UNEP Environment Alert Bulletin, January 2005.
6acute risk to human health in developing countries, as the latter have become commonly
known to serve as dumping grounds - both legally and otherwise - for defunct electronics
from many post-industrialized nations.4 The vast aqua-terrestrial pollution caused by
informal e-waste “recycling centers” in developing economies, and the ill-health of
communities which rely on this type of dangerous work as a source of income, controvert
the socio-environmental legitimacy of the international e-waste trade, and further call into
question the effectiveness of current international norms which aim to prohibit the import
of hazardous wastes into developing countries.
The Perspectives
Since 1990, when American journalist Bill Moyers first directed public attention to
industrialized countries’ common practice of exporting electronic waste to Asia, through
his book and video Global Dumping Ground: The International Traffic in Hazardous
Wastes,5 there have emerged various transnational environmental networks committed to
tracking and publicly exposing the critically negative impact that the global e-waste trade
continues to have on environmental and human health in developing nations.
Investigative reports released by environmental activist organizations such as the Basel
Action Network, Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition and Greenpeace International,
documenting how e-waste is exported from various industrialized countries and
subsequently treated at popular destination points in Southeast Asia and Africa, have
                                                 
4 See notes 11 and 24.
5 Moyers, B. Global Dumping Ground : The International Traffic in Hazardous Wastes (Santa
Ana, CA : Seven Locks Press, 1990).
7aptly framed this new, technological variation of the hazardous waste trade as a violation
of international labour and human rights, in particular the right to occupational and
environmental health.6 Environmental sociologists examining the transnational e-waste
trade have also come to similar conclusions on the devastating and unfair environmental
burdens that are thus transferred from affluent countries to the third world.7 David
Naguib Pellow has drawn attention to the race and class inequalities embedded in the
dumping of hazardous wastes in poor communities of the Global South, a trend evidently
followed by global electronic waste streams.8 In Challenging the Chip, the most recent
comprehensive, geographically inclusive and pluridisciplinary anthology to date on the
ecological and health impacts of the global electronics industry, Watterson and Chang
poignantly note that:
Two disturbing phenomenon are generally found where clusters of electronics
manufacturing, assembly and disassembly are located: the generation of serious
occupational and environmental hazards for workers and nearby communities
(Byster & Smith 1999; Fox 1991; LaDou 1984; Sonnenfeld 2004) and the
intensification of social inequalities through low wages and labour
                                                 
6 See Puckett, J. et al. Exporting Harm : The High-Tech Trashing of Asia (Seattle : BAN/SVTC,
2002); Puckett, J., Westervelt, S., Gutierrez, R., Takamiya, Y., The Digital Dump : Exporting Re-
Use and Abuse to Africa (Seattle : BAN, 2005); Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, Poison PC’s
and Toxic TVs : California’s Biggest Environmental Crisis That You’ve Never Heard of (San
Jose, CA : SVTC, 2001); Greenpeace Research Laboratories (K. Brigden, I. labunska, D. Santillo,
P. Johnston) Chemical contamination at e-waste recycling and disposal sites in Accra and
Korforidua, Ghana (Amsterdam : Greenpeace International, August 2008).
7 Pellows, D.N., “The global waste trade and enviromental justice struggles” in Gallagher, K.P.
ed., Handbook on Trade and the Environment (Northampton : Edward Elgar, February 2009);
Clapp J., Toxic Exports : The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from  Rich to Poor Countries
(Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2001); Grossman, E., High Tech Trash : Digital Devices,
Hidden Toxics and Human Health (Washington DC : Island Press, 2006).
8 See Pellow, D. N., Resisting Global Toxics : Transnational Movements for Environmental
Justice (Cambridge : MIT Press, 2007).
8disempowerment (Hossfield 1988; Nash & Fernandez-Kelly 1983, Park 1992;
Robinson & McIlwee 1989).9    
Substantiating these claims of environmental injustice is an abundance of newly
emerging scientific research which points to severe ecological and human heavy metal
contamination in the major e-waste processing regions of China and India.10
The Thesis
With electronic wastes representing the newest and most threatening form of hazardous
wastes, there have been significant efforts at the international level, to prohibit e-waste
export to developing nations, namely through the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,11 a multilateral
                                                 
9 Watterson, A., Chang, S., “Environmental Justice and Labor Rights” in  Smith, T., Sonnenfeld,
D.A.,Pellow, D.N., eds., Challenging the Chip (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006) At
107.
10 Fu J., Zhou, Q., Liu, J., et al., “High levels of heavy metals in rice (Oryza sativa L.) from a
typical E-Waste recycling area in southeast China and its potential risk to human health”,
Chemosphere 71 (2008). 1269-1275; Leung, A., Nurdan, S., et al., “Heavy Metals Concentrations
of Surface Dust from e-Waste Recycling and Its Human Health Implications in Southeast China”,
42 Environmental Science and Technology 7 (2008)2674-2680; Huo, X., Peng, L., Xu, X. et al.,
“Elevated blood lead levels of children in Guiyu, an electronic waste recycling town in China”,
Environmnetal Health Perspective 15 (2007) 1113-1117; Webb. S, “E-waste Hazards : Chinese
Gear Recyclers Absorbs Toxic chemicals”, Science News (July 14, 2007); Atmospheric
Environment (authors W.J. Deng et al.) November 1, 2006; Sepulveda A., Schluep, M., Renaud,
F., Streicher, M., Kuehr, R., Hagelkun, C., Gerecke, A.,“A review of the environmental fate and
effects of hazardous substances released from electrical and electronic equipments during
recycling: Examples from China and India”, Environmental Impact Assessment Review (2009 -
in press) doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2009.04.001; Walters, A., Santillo, D., Evidence of environmental and
health impacts of electronics recycling in China: An Update (Amsterdam, Greenpeace
International,2008).
11 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal 1673 UNTS 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989). [hereinafter the Basel Convention]
9environmental treaty adopted in 1989 as a measure to protect developing nations from
industrialized countries’ hazardous wastes, and to fulfill a more broader objective of
ensuring global environmentally sound practices in hazardous waste management.12
Though it remains the most widely ratified13 international treaty to regulate transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes, the Basel Convention has been criticized as being too
weak a mechanism to effectively fulfill its primary objective of minimizing international
movements of hazardous wastes towards poor countries, the main reason being the
remarkably low ratification rate of the 1995 Basel Ban Amendment, that is the specific
instrument to illegalize all transfers of hazardous wastes from OECD countries and
Litchenstein to non-OECD countries.14 This thesis analyzes the legal status of the global
e-waste trade under an unenforced Basel ban amendment. It seeks to clarify the limits of
the Basel Convention’s regulation of electronic wastes, providing a detailed legal
examination of existing loopholes in the original Convention that appear to allow
hazardous wastes, such as e-wastes, to be internationally traded for the purposes of
recycling and reuse. The following questions are addressed: To what extent is the
international trade of electronic wastes controlled under the Basel Convention? Is it
illegal for industrialized countries to ship their electronic waste to developing countries?
                                                 
12 On the background and negotiating history of the Basel Convention, see Kummer, K.,
International Management of Hazardous Wastes: The Basel Convention and Related Legal Rules
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Kreuger, J., “The Basel Convention and the Interrnational
Trade in Hazardous Wastes”, in Stokke, O.S., Thommenssen, O.B., eds., Yearbook of
International Cooperation on Environment and Development (London: Earthscan, 2001). See
also Park, R.S., “An Examination of International Environmental Racism through the Lens of
Trasboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes”, 5 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 659-
688 (1998).
13 There are currently 172 Parties to Convention. (Last verified: 31 October 2009).
14 On political responses to the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment, see Clapp, J.,
supra note 7.
10
Further on, this thesis examines resistance to the Basel ban, which has not come
exclusively from industrialized nations such as Canada, the USA, Japan and Australia,
but also from many developing nations which fear the ban may unjustifiably exclude
them from the international waste recyclables market, reducing their opportunities for
economic growth, increasing their manufacturing industries’ reliance on natural resource
extraction, and invoking a significant loss in their international bargaining power.15 This
thesis addresses the important social and economic development implications of the
enforcement of the Basel ban, in particular, its impact on the international waste
recyclables industry. In this respect, it seeks to provide answers to the following
questions: Would an enforced Basel ban infringe upon international free trade rules of the
WTO, to which many Basel Parties also belong? Is enforcement of the Basel ban
necessary to ensure environmentally sound e-waste management on a global level? Are
there other legal mechanisms which can provide effective protection to human and
environmental health without negatively impacting recycling industries in developing
nations? Can environmental justice be rendered alongside economic growth to the poor
communities in China, India and other developing nations involved in the global e-waste
business?
                                                 
15 Puckett, J., Fogel, C., A Victory for Environment and Justice: The Basel Ban and How it
Happened (Amsterdam: Greenpeace International,1994); Poulakidas, D.M., “Waste Trade and
Disposal in the Americas”, 21 Vermont Law Review 873 (1997); Webster-Main, A., Keeping
Africa out of the Global Backyard”, 26 Environs Environmental Law and Policy Journal 65
(2002).  
11
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on the legality of the global e-waste
trade16 by further providing a comparative analysis of internationally emerging electronic
waste governance strategies, assessing the practical effects of a diverse range of
instruments – international treaty regimes, national laws, product design policies and
other initiatives – which aim to mitigate the environmental harm of obsolete electronics,
in some cases by restricting hazardous e-waste flows into developing countries. The
ultimate objective is to understand how stakeholders can model the manufacture, use and
disuse of technologies so that they may continue to raise living standards and propel
human development, while simultaneously respecting international legal standards, the
natural environment and the quality of life of future generations.
Part One begins with a discourse on the definition of e-waste, followed by an overview of
the environmental and health hazards with which it is associated. The controversial
practice of e-waste export towards developing countries is then presented, its driving
factors and human health implications are discussed. The focus then shifts to current
international legal efforts to ban the import of e-waste into developing countries via the
Basel Convention, which constitutes the primary international treaty regime governing
the trade of hazardous wastes.
                                                 
16 Kummer, K., supra note 12; Kreuger, J. supra note 12; Wirth D.A., “International Trade in
Wastes: Trade Implications of the Recent Amendment to the Basel Convention Banning North-
South Trade in Hazardous Wastes, 7 Review of European Community & International
Environmental Law 237 (1998); Guevara, M., Hart M., Trade Policy Implications of the Basel
Convention Export Ban on Recyclables from Developed to Developing Countries (Ottawa:
International Council on Metals and the Environment, 1996).
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In Part Two, legal issues surrounding the Basel Convention’s attempts to control the e-
waste trade are discussed, followed by an examination of implementation and compliance
issues under the scope of the Convention. After assessing the effectiveness of the
international treaty regime governing the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes,
I elaborate on why it is insufficient to focus governance efforts at the disposal or end-of-
life phase of products, emphasizing the benefits of lifecycle thinking in environmental
policy and management.
Part Three discusses the extent to which lifecycle thinking has been integrated into e-
waste governance. First I compare European, Chinese, American and Canadian efforts to
manage e-waste through sustainable electronics production, which can be understood as
the adoption of policies based on extended producer responsibility and environmental
product design. Drawing on observations that result from my international comparative
analysis of e-waste policy models, I highlight certain key governance areas that merit
greater legislative attention in all regions examined. On a concluding note, I discuss the
role of sustainable consumption in e-waste management, addressing why this factor has
largely been overlooked, and offering insight into the types of legal norms and other
innovative mechanisms through which the concept may be operationalized, allowing it to
play a more useful role in mitigating environmental pollution caused by the prevalent use
and disposal of electronics.
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Part One: Tracing the Toxic Unbeing of Modern Electronics
I. E-waste Definitions
The pervasion of human-computer interaction in all aspects of daily life is a salient
feature of the contemporary global economy, one that presents new concerns in relation
to environmental and human health. While the emergence and popularity of new
electronic products in the markets of the world continue to facilitate human life to almost
instant gratification, it is when we begin to consider the environmental burden of these
products that their long-term benefits become less self-evident. With the impressive pace
at which electronic products become available, accessible, obsolete and upgraded, for a
constantly expanding consumer market, the world is faced with an estimated 20 to 50
million tonnes of electronic waste each year.17  Currently, e-waste is the most rapidly
growing area of waste production worldwide and following the current trend towards the
computerization of almost every imaginable consumer good, or ubiquitous computing18,
the generation of electronic waste is very likely to keep increasing. To understand the
scope of the challenge that e-wastes brings to global environmental governance, it is
imperative to understand what type of consumer products qualify as e-wastes once they
have been discarded.
While there is no global consensus on the legal definition of e-waste, it is the commonly
                                                 
17 United Nations Environment Program, “Basel Conference Addresses Electronic Waste
Challenge,” Press Release (Nairobi, 27 November 2006).
18 Weiser,M., The Computer of the 21st Century, Scientific American (Septermber 1991).
14
used term for waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), also referred to as end-
of-life or post-consumer electronics. Every country establishes their own list of e-waste
products, which generally range from entertainment and communication technologies
(computers, mobile phones, laptops, headphones and video game consoles) to large
household appliances.
There is actually a great degree of variation between existing e-waste policies on the
scope of electronics that are regulated as e-wastes. Countries belonging to the European
Union are expected to legally recognize as e-waste the list of products contained in the
EU Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive.19 The WEEE directive
classifies electronic waste under ten different categories: large household appliances
(category 1), small household appliances (category 2), IT and telecommunications
equipment (category 3), consumer equipment (category 4), lighting equipment (category
5), electrical and electronic tools (category 6), toys, leisure and sports equipment
(category 7), medical devices (category 8), monitoring and controlling instruments
(category 9), and automatic dispensers (category 10). Some Asian countries (China,
Japan, Korea) have adopted national e-waste classification lists based on the EU model.
In Canada, e-waste is not regulated at the national level, except for voluntary guidelines
that have been set by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, to guide
                                                 
19 EU, Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003
on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), Official Journal of the European Union, L.
37/24, Annexes 1A and 1B. [hereinafter the WEEE directive].
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provinces in establishing their own e-waste classification lists.20 The provinces of
Ontario, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Alberta have all enacted
legislation specifying the scope of products that are to be treated as electronic waste in
their respective territories. The province of Quebec’s newly released draft bill21 which
regulates e-wastes along with other hazardous wastes, provides an exhaustive list of
electronic products that fall under the scope of the prospective mandatory recycling
regime. Unfortunately, a lack of harmonization between current provincial e-waste
policies with respect to the recyclable product scope and the division of collection and
financing responsibilities between the relevant stakeholders results in superfluous
administrative costs for manufacturers that must meet compliance requirements in more
than one province. While these costs may be relatively minor for global manufacturers,
they represent a significant financial burden on small-scale producers. Furthermore, the
current regulatory landscape of patchwork policies creates a potentially competitive
scenario between provinces, whereby consumers and businesses may choose to purchase
electronics in the province where their financial obligations in e-waste recycling are
minimal.    
While Quebec and Manitoba have come out with proposals for e-waste legislation, in
Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Yukon, Nunavut and the Northwest Territories
there has been limited governmental effort towards electronic waste regulation. The
                                                 
20See Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Canada-Wide Principles for Electronics
Product Stewardship: Recommended E-Waste Products (CCME, April 5, 2005).
21Projet de Règlement sur la récupération et la valorisation de produits par les entreprises, Loi
sur la qualité de l’environnenment, (L.R.Q., c. Q-2, a. 31, a. 53.30, a. 70.19, 1er al., par. 15, a.
109.1).
16
United States framework is similar to that of Canada, with no federal e-waste policy
currently in place, and various degrees of regulation emerging at the State-level.
Legal definitions aside, it is impossible to define e-waste in absolute terms, or to narrow
it down to an exhaustive list of consumer products, as electronic components are being
integrated into an increasing scope of commodities that were not traditionally
computerized.22 Moreover, new types of electronic appliances designed to meet newly
emerging human needs are being conceived and placed on the global market
continuously. Taking these factors into consideration, the OECD’s definition for e-waste:
“any appliance using an electric power supply that has reached its end-of-life”23 is
probably most aptly indicative of the massive open-ended scope of commodities that
actually qualify as electronic wastes. Ultimately, e-waste encompasses all discarded
objects embedded with an electronic chip.24
II. Environmental Responsibility Concerns
The common characteristics of all e-waste items, from where stem environmental
responsibility concerns, is that their components (glass, wires, circuit boards, cathode ray
tubes, plastics and other materials) contain non-negligible quantities of highly toxic
                                                 
22 For examples of novel uses of computerization see David, M., “Adidas Designs a Winner with
Smart Running Shoes,” (April 2005) Electronic Design; Gawel, R., “Electronic Shirt Lets You
Rock and Roll,” (December 2006) Electronic Design.
23 OECD, Extended Producer Responsibility: A Guidance Manual for Governments (Paris :
OECD, 2001).
24 Hilty, L.M., “Electronic Waste – An Emerging Risk?” (2005) 25 Environmental Impact
Assessment Review. 431 – 435.
17
substances (lead, mercury, cadmium, beryllium and flame retardants, amongst many
others), whose extremely harmful effects to human health and the environment have been
well documented and internationally recognized.25 It has also been shown that disposal of
e-waste, in the form of landfilling and incineration, releases these toxins into the
environment, creating substantial land and air pollution.26 As such, recycling e-waste –
which implies recuperating the valuable, reusable materials found in it and seeing to the
safe disposal of toxins – reduces the amount of waste that is landfilled or incinerated,
making it the preferred way to manage used electronic equipment, from a human and
environmental health perspective.27 Of course, a minimization of risks can only occur if
e-waste is recycled in conditions which respect relevant environmental and human safety
standards. For example, the first step of proper e-waste recycling generally involves safe
manual disassembly, for which workers must be equipped with protective glass-resistant
gloves and arm-wear, face shields and breathing masks to prevent dust and particle
inhalation. For the second step of mechanical processing where e-waste is shredded,
special systems are needed for the filtration of gas emissions and treatment of effluents,
in order to minimize their environmental impact. Worker exposure to potentially harmful
                                                 
25 Five Winds International, Toxics and Hazardous Materials in Electronics, An Environmental
Scan of Toxic and Hazardous Materials in IT and Telecom Products, Final Report for
Environment Canada, National Office Pollution Prevention and Industry Canada, Computers for
School Program (Ottawa: Five Winds International, October 2001). Hu, H.,“Human Health and
Heavy Metals Exposure”, in M. McCally ed., Life Support: The Environment and Human Health
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). EU, Explanatory Memorandum, Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment (WEEE) Directive (Third Draft), Brussels, 05.07.1999.
26 Id., Five Winds International. At 24.
27 See Hischier, R., Wäger, P., Gauglhofer, J., “Does WEEE recycling make sense from an
environmental perspective? The environmental impacts of the Swiss take-back and recycling
systems for waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE)” 25 Environmental Impact
Assessment Review 525 – 539.
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e-waste shredding byproducts must be strictly monitored and controlled to not exceed
relevant maximum allowable concentration standards.28  
The main problem presented by the recycling of electronics is that not all recycling
industries have access to the knowledge, skills, infrastructure or other resources
necessary for the environmentally sound treatment of e-wastes. And very often, even
recyclers that are aware of the environmental responsibilities to be assumed with e-waste
collection and processing neglect to fulfill their related obligations for reasons that have
to do with individual economic viability and profitability. As such, the regulation of e-
waste recycling itself is a complex, multi-faceted issue and any initiatives in this regard
can only be successful in controlling e-pollution if a comprehensive legislative
framework is introduced. The following section points out the major deficiencies in
existing e-waste recycling policies.
1. Recycling Choices: To Process or Export?
Having understood the drastic pollutive effects of dumping electronics into ordinary solid
waste streams, the European Union and several other industrialized nations, along with
progressive U.S. States and Canadian provinces, have introduced legislation imposing
landfill bans on electronic products, thus creating mandatory recycling systems.
However, while defunct electronics are increasingly being legally recognized as
                                                 
28 For more information on the steps of safe e-waste recycling, see Swiss E-waste Competence,
On the E-Waste Wheel of Life. Web resource available at http://www.e-waste.ch (Last Access : 20
October 2009)  
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hazardous material that should not be landfilled or incinerated,29 there are significant
costs involved in collecting and dismantling electronic waste in industrialized countries,
as strict environmental, and occupational health and safety regulations must be respected
throughout the recycling process. Furthermore, the capital-intensive business of recycling
electronics is not always public-funded, making it less financially interesting. In
developed countries in particular, where the market for secondary raw materials has
greatly diminished since the uprooting of most manufacturing industries, there is little
market demand for the precious metals and other resources derived from e-waste
recycling. For these reasons, waste management and recycling industries of the ‘global
north’, who are continuously faced with larger amounts of e-waste, often export it in
massive quantities to the ‘global south’, where recycling standards are less stringent, if at
all applicable.
By turning over domestically generated e-waste into the global market, recyclers - in
addition to avoiding the excessive costs and environmental obligations related to
dismantling electronic equipment themselves - are able to acquire substantial revenues
through collection-related charges imposed on consumers at the time of discard, and
evidently, from sale to foreign waste dealers. This form of ‘recycling’, which is
essentially e-waste export, has proven to be highly profitable, accountability-free and
environmentally convenient for developed economies.
                                                 
29 See WEEE directive, supra note 19. For an updated list of U.S. jurisdictions which have passed
e-waste disposal bans or where draft bills have been proposed, see Computer Take-back
Campaign, State Legislation on E-Waste, Web resource available at:
http://www.computertakeback.com/legislation/state_legislation.htm (Last Access: 20 October
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The international e-waste trade typically takes place through e-commerce websites (e.g.
www.recycle.net) where e-waste brokers and dealers from across the globe – meaning
businesses that buy and sell electronic waste or act as middlemen arranging e-waste
disposal on behalf of other companies or waste producers – post listings describing the
type of e-waste they wish to acquire or sell. Parties interested in a particular listing need
only to supply an e-mail address and are instantly put in contact with the buyer or seller.
As a 2008 report by the Unites States Government Accountability Office (GAO)
disturbingly revealed, very often U.S. e-waste ‘recyclers’ that claim to process used
electronics domestically and in an environmentally sound manner, actually use these
trading websites to sell U.S.-generated e-waste to foreign brokers for shipment to
Southeast Asia.30 The GAO study found that at least 43 U.S.-based recyclers were willing
to export lead-impregnated cathode ray tubes (CRT’s) to Asia, in violation of the U.S.
export-notification rules for CRT’s.31
Figures from the United States recycling industry indicate that eighty percent (80%) of
their recuperated e-waste is forwarded to Asia.32 A report issued by the British
Environment Agency indicates that in 2003, 160,000 tonnes of e-waste recuperated in the
                                                 
30 GAO, Electronic Waste: EPA Needs to Better Control Harmful U.S. Exports through Stronger
Enforcement and More Comprehensive Regulation (Washington DC: GAO, August 2008).
31 Id. At 23.
32 Puckett J., et al., supra note 6.
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UK was illegally exported to the Indian subcontinent, Africa and China for recycling.33
Similarly, electronic waste exports destined for non-OECD countries were also found in
an inspection of several European seaports conducted between 2004 and 2006,34 despite
the EU’s adoption of the Basel Ban, an amendment to the Basel Convention which
essentially prohibits EU countries from exporting hazardous waste into non-OECD
countries, for disposal or recycling purposes.
2. Export: Bridging the Digital Divide or Dumping Hazardous Waste?
The transfer of obsolete electronics from rich to poor nations, either compensated or
gratuitous, is not a trading scheme that manifestly conflicts with social or economic
development goals. In fact, the renewal of product lifecycles between the ‘first world’
and the ‘third world’ fulfills a significant portion of manufacturing industries’ infinite
needs for raw materials such as copper, gold and silver, thereby assisting in the
preservation of natural resources. Charitable donations of old computers and other IT
equipment from industrialized countries to less prosperous ones may also help to bridge
the ‘digital divide’ by making technology available to consumers and social institutions
who do not have access to comparable resources. However, the controversial problem
surrounding these import schemes into developing countries, is that any social and
economic advancement that has resulted from the e-waste trade so far, has taken place in
a context of severe environmental degradation. There is no doubt that IT sector growth in
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34 European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law
(IMPEL), IMPEL-TFS Project II : ‘International Cooperation in Enforcement Hitting Illegal
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developing countries – largely attributable to second-hand equipment flows from western
countries – has enhanced the competitiveness of these nations, in particular by providing
widespread access to mobile phone and internet technologies to financially and
infrastructurally disadvantaged cities and villages. At the same time, IT equipment
donation has also been used as a pretext for hazardous e-waste dumping. For example, of
the estimated 400,000 units of used computer equipment which were arriving monthly to
the port of Lagos (Nigeria) in 2005, as much as 75% had no potential for repair or reuse.35
Qualifying only as e-waste, this mass of equipment presenting no possibilities for
beneficial use could only be sent for indefinite storage in warehouses, due to the lack of
proper, environmentally sound e-waste collection and recycling infrastructure in the
region, and the overall scarcity of such programs in all of Africa.36  While Nigeria does
have a prominent and highly skilled IT repair and resale sector, it is far from possessing
sophisticated systems for precious metals recovery or e-waste recycling, and thus the
common way to deal with this waste stream, like all others, is routine burning in open
landfills.37
Even in developing countries such as China and India, which contain expansive e-waste
recycling markets (in addition to reuse and repair markets such as those in Africa), the
salient feature of their electronic waste  industries is that they are largely comprised of
informal sector businesses, who do not possess the occupational knowledge, or the
                                                 
35 Puckett J. et al., The Digital Dump, supra note 6.
36 Id.
37 Ibid.
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financial and technical capacities, to process e-waste in an environmentally sound
manner. Their dangerous ‘recycling’ methods have come under global scrutiny for posing
grave, long-term damage to human and ecosystem health.
3. Health and Environmental Effects of E-Waste Exports to Developing Countries
Several studies conducted by environmental and human rights organizations over the last
two decades have revealed the starkly polluted reality of electronic scrap yards in
developing economies, where informal sector workers recycle imported e-waste items in
order to recuperate precious metals and other valuable materials that they subsequently
sell to manufacturing industries.38
While the livelihood of an entire community can depend on crude e-waste recycling, as
observed in the village of Guiyu located in the Guangdong Province of China, the
economic benefit derived from this activity comes at a high cost to human health. The
typical working conditions and manual disassembly methods of informal recycling
networks in Guiyu, such as open-pit acid burning and makeshift charcoal grilling of
circuit boards, would simply be deemed illegal in developed countries for the acute
occupational hazards they present. Medical evidence from the region substantiates the
                                                 
38 Greenpeace Research Laboratories (K. Brigden, I. Labunska, D. Santillo, M. Allsopp,
Department of Biological Sciences University of Exeter, UK) Recycling of Electronic Waste in
China and India: Workplace and Environmental Contamination (Amsterdam: Greenpeace
International, 2005); Toxic Links, Scrapping the High-tech Myth (Delhi: Toxic Links India,
2003); Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, supra note 6; Thakker,N., “India’s Toxic Landfills: A
dumping ground for the World’s Electronic Waste,” (2006) 6(3) Sustainable Development Law
and Policy.
24
devastating human health impacts of processing e-waste in this rudimentary, unprotected
manner, as high rates of bone disease, respiratory problems, and neurological disorders
have been observed among Guiyu e-waste workers and their children. A recent study
indicates that Guiyu’s e-waste recyclers have elevated body levels of persistent toxic
substances.39 A separate study shows that the children of these workers possess higher
levels of lead in their bodies, as compared to Guiyu children whose parents work in other
industries.40 The long-term human health effects of exposure to heavy metals commonly
found in e-waste illustrate the gravity of these findings:
• Barium: high blood pressure, changes to heart rhythm, paralysis, death
• Cadmium: kidney disease, lung damage, fragile bones
• Chromium: liver, kidney, circulatory and nerve tissues damage, cancer
• Mercury: lung and neurological damage, delirium, fetal and infant neural system
damage, mental retardation and diminishment in motor function, language and
memory.
• Lead: brain and kidney damage, lower sperm production in men, causes pregnant
women to miscarriage, disrupts normal growth and development of the brain and
                                                 
39 Bi, X., Thomas, G.O., Jones, K.C., Qu, W.Y., Sheng, G.Y., Martin,F.L., Fu, J.M., “Exposure of
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40 Huo, X. et al., supra note 10.
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central nervous system in children and fetuses causing mental retardation and
lower intelligence.41
Just as critical as the issue of widespread human contamination caused by local e-waste
activities, is the manifestly causal relationship between Guiyu’s crude recycling sector
and the considerable magnitude of aquatic and terrestrial harm by which the village is
affected. The local water is considered to have become unfit for consumption
“approximately one year after the appearance of the WEEE industry.”42. As for the extent
of contamination, water samples taken from the Lianjiang River in 2001 revealed lead
levels to be 190 times higher than safety standards set by the World Health
Organization.43  Through irrigation, this polluted water has infiltrated the soil, resulting in
highly contaminated agricultural produce that local farmers do not consume themselves
due to health safety concerns, but instead, sell to outsiders unaware of the polluted crop
origins.44 Significant airborne pollution is another major side effect of electronics
dismantling in Guiyu, as evidenced by the elevated concentrations of heavy metals found
in the surface dust of schoolyards and food markets located in the areas surrounding e-
waste recycling workshops.45 Because heavy metal contamination can be passed to
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humans through dust inhalation, ingestion and dermal absorption, it is clear that all local
residents - regardless of whether or not they have been directly implicated in e-waste
recycling - are adversely affected by e-waste debris.
Like Guiyu, the city of Taizhou, located in the Zhejiang Province of China, has also been
severely polluted by the activities of its informal recycling industry. But unlike Guiyu,
where farming has largely been abandoned since the emergence of e-waste recycling,
agricultural production remains an integral part of Taizhou’s economy. A recent study
measuring the levels of heavy metals in rice crops from Taizhou revealed that lead and
cadmium levels, both in soil and polished rice, were significantly above their national
maximum allowable concentrations, consequently concluding that “daily intake of rice or
crops grown in this area could cause detrimental health hazards to the consumers.” 46
Considering Taizhou’s coastal proximity and the fact that it is one of China’s major
export-oriented agricultural production areas for grain, fruit, seafood and tea, the adverse
human health repercussions of its informal e-waste recycling industry affect a population
far greater than the local or even national citizenry.  The Taizhou study, in pointing out
that crop contamination issues also impact communities living downstream or downwind
of affected areas,47 draws attention to the global dimension of the e-waste problem,
specifically, the latter’s expansive and geographically indeterminate scope of harm. The
latest figures provided by the Municipality of Taizhou indicate that in 2004, revenue from
agricultural exports from the region increased by 47.5% from the preceding year, and
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twenty nine new agricultural projects drew in USD 32.621 million in foreign
investment.48  The same source indicates that Taizhou holds 30% of the world market
share for canned oranges, and that its citrus products constitute a large share of exports.49
Some of Taizhou’s canned fruit products are shipped to Canada - for example, from
companies such as the Huangyan Canned Food factory No.3.50  In fact, mandarins,
clementines and other citrus hybrids rank fourth in the top Canadian agri-food imports
from China.51 Taking into consideration these international agricultural trade flows, the
heavy metal contamination of Taizhou’s soil, water and crops that is directly related to
informal e-waste processing, constitutes a global consumer health issue.
Other confirmed destinations for e-waste export include India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana,
Singapore, the Philippines, and Brazil,52 all of which have extensive informal e-waste
recycling networks operating outside international and national labour and environmental
standards.53 Despite the acute levels of pollution posed by e-waste recycling as it is
carried out in these countries, the latter remain compelled, by the economic, social and
industrial circumstances of the world economy, to continue to receive obsolete
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electronics from the United States, Canada, Japan, the European Union and other
countries of the ‘global north’. High levels of poverty and unemployment in developing
countries, together with the presence of manufacturing industries and the existence of
large secondary consumer markets for secondhand electronics, are factors that have
encouraged and facilitated steady e-waste flows into these nations. International debt has
also been a contributing factor, as many poor countries have sought fiscal relief through
the hazardous waste trade. In fact, the World Bank has been widely accused of
advocating and funding these types of hazardous waste export schemes to less developed
countries (LDC).54
Additionally, it seems that the overall ecological modernization of industrialized
societies, propelled by the growing political influence of ‘first-world’ environmental
rights movements, has also inadvertently benefited the global e-waste trade, which,
according to an industry research report, was expected to rise to USD 11 billion by
2009.55 Of course there is no way of confirming with any degree of precision how close
actual worldwide trade in e-waste has come to the forecasted figure, as much of this
trade, following the legacy of other hazardous waste trade streams, not only lacks
transparency but hovers between legal and illegal realms.56 Still, it is logical to assume
that this continually growing amount of e-waste, which is being rejected by an increasing
number of western landfills, is entering developing country markets. This is because
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progressive environmental standards such as e-waste landfill bans, have not always been
coupled with mandatory domestic e-waste recycling programs and processing facilities,
and have thus only succeeded in diverting electronics from local landfills (protecting
local human and environmental health) without however, contributing in any way to the
mitigation of health risks at a global level. By failing to provide comprehensive,
sustainable e-waste collection and treatment strategies at a local level, these
environmental initiatives have served as an export incentive to waste dealers  that do not
possess environmentally sound recycling technologies or simply seek to maximize
profitability on the discarded electronics they have collected and are unable to landfill
locally.
In essence, it seems that the new environmental responsibilities related to the disposal of
electronics that are being imposed on consumers across many industrialized nations  for
example, through e-waste landfill bans - do not necessarily translate into better
environmental protection worldwide, as export continues to be the prevalent means of
‘recycling’ electronics in many developed countries. In effect, these type of legislative
measures which exclusively seek to protect domestic health interests only encourage
international e-waste flows to developing nations. Moreover, a  near complete absence of
social and environmental responsibility amongst the various stakeholders involved in
global e-waste trading results from the ongoing liberalized trade of second-hand
electronics and has made it so that the ecological burden of end-of-life technology
purchased and enjoyed in industrialized nations, is very directly assumed by the
developing world population, alongside certain short-term economic benefits. Ultimately,
30
the e-waste trade renders privatized benefits to some individuals, at the expense of
violating the rights to health and environmental protection of poor communities’ on a
global scale. In fact, a broad range of internationally guaranteed human rights are
negatively impacted by e-waste recycling activities carried out in developing countries.
4. Human Rights Implications
The right to health is clearly affirmed as a fundamental human right, notably under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that “everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family.” The
right to health in the context of work is also recognized as a universal human right, with
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights57 guaranteeing the
right of everyone to safe and healthy working conditions (Article 7b) and the right of
children to be free from employment that is harmful to their health (Article 10(3)).
Additionally, under the ICSECR, State Parties affirm the “right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health”58, and
further recognize that measures necessary to ensure the realization of this right include
“the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene.”  Other
examples of human rights instruments with stipulations on health include the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ILO Occupational Safety and Health
Convention (No.155) and the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries (No.169).
The international environmental regime has also been attentive to the interconnection
between human health, environmental protection, and human rights. This linkage,
initially understood as environmental protection being a precondition to the exercise of
the fundamental human rights to life and health,59 appeared in the Stockholm
Declaration60, adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(1972):
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of
life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being
[…]
      (Principle 1, Stockholm Declaration)
Human health is also a central concern of sustainable development, a concept
contemporarily understood as the purpose of local to global environmental governance,
and equally regarded as the ultimate objective of the international economy.61 The
concept was originally introduced by the World Commission on Environment and
Development (Brundtland Commission) as a matter of human well-being:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
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without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
It contains within it two key concepts:
-the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to
which overriding priority should be given; and
-the idea of ‘limitations’ imposed by the state of technology and social
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.62
The Brundtland Commission advanced a new understanding of the interrelationship
between human rights and environmental protection, in its assertion of an independent
and substantive human right to a healthy environment:
All human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for
their health and well-being. 63
Since the Brundtland Commission report, the right to a healthy environment has been
guaranteed in over one hundred Constitutions of the world – including China- and
enforced by courts in India, South Africa, Argentina, Delhi, Costa Rica and Colombia.64
The protection of human health, referred to in practically all environmental agreements,
is also the primary objective of the Rio Declaration, adopted at the 1992 UN Conference
on Environment and Development:
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They
are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.65
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As such, the protection of human health has emerged as a forefront concern of
international human rights and environmental regimes, with policies from both spheres
recalling the fundamental importance of ensuring that economic progress is achieved
with due respect to the human right to health. Regarding the human rights implications of
global toxic waste industries in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights, upon
appointing a Special Rapporteur on the adverse effects of the movement and dumping of
toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights [hereinafter
Special Rapporteur], drew attention to:
the growing practice of the dumping in African and other developing countries
by transnational corporations and other enterprises from industrialized countries
of hazardous and other wastes that constitute a serious threat to the human rights
to life and health of everyone, and which they cannot dispose of within their
territories of operation.66
Since then, rising electronic waste exports from industrialized countries have been
explicitly identified, by both former and current Special Rapporteurs, as an obstacle to
the realization of the human right to health in developing countries. In 2004, the Special
Rapporteur affirmed the clear linkage between wastes and toxic products and the right to
health, noting further that the latter was jeopardized by the “export of electronic waste for
scrapping, in conditions harmful to the health of workers and populations.”67 The 2006
Report of the Special Rapporteur Okechukwu Ibeanu pointed to patterns of
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environmental injustice that have characterized the global e-waste trade, stating that:
the poor, the vulnerable, and the marginalized suffer disproportionately from
exposure to toxic chemicals.[…] The continuing export of electronic wastes from
developed to developing countries for recycling or disposal in conditions which
often directly expose workers and communities to toxic chemicals is another
example of the particular burden faced by individuals and communities in
developing countries.  It is a problem which requires urgent attention, both at the
international level and at the level of both exporting and importing
Governments.68
Evidently, the massive pollution caused by e-waste export into developing countries
poses an obstacle to the enjoyment of internationally recognized human rights to life, and
to health, as the Guiyu and Taizhou case studies overwhelmingly indicate.  The lead-
contaminated produce and waterways that characterize these e-waste processing regions
deny the local population from essential aspects of their rights to life and to health, that
are safe and nutritious food and clean drinking water. Moreover, because crude e-waste
recycling is an unregulated informal sector activity, workers are deprived of fundamental
labour rights such as the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the
right to be free from abusive labour conditions.69 The use of underage workers, a
common trait of crude e-waste recycling networks across borders,70 is a further affront to
children’s human right to be free from economic exploitation and dangerous work.71
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These human and labour rights issues, and the general lack of decent work opportunities
available from transboundary flows of electronic waste towards developing countries,
were recently addressed at the ILO Green Jobs for Asia Research Conference.72 In
regards China, it was pointed out that although the e-waste recycling industry created
roughly 700,000 jobs, 98% of these workers were employed in informal structures, and
did not have access to health insurance, unemployment or pension schemes, occupational
health and safety training, or mechanisms for worker association and participation.73
With China and other newly industrializing countries’ recycling industries expected to
evolve into even more massive employment sectors, due to the world manufacturing
markets being continually pressured for resources that have become increasingly scarce
and costly, the establishment of decent work opportunities in materials management and
recycling has become a new priority focus area for the ILO, under its new “Green Jobs
Initiative”, launched in partnership with the United Nations Environment Program. At the
UNESCO Future Forum held in Guiyang City, China, on 21 August 2009, the Director of
the ILO Office in China and Mongolia, Constance Thomas, noted that most of the 10
million individuals involved in China’s recycling sector were employed in hazardous
jobs, with minimal labour protection.74 Addressing e-waste recycling specifically, she
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signaled that with China receiving up to 70% of global electronic equipment discards, the
area presented high potential for ‘decent work’ growth, if only labour rights and
environmental protection mechanisms were introduced.75
Although the social and environmental unsustainability of the electronic waste trade may
have only recently been prioritized as a global governance challenge, labour and
environmental injustices linked to hazardous waste industries have long been known. The
effect of improper hazardous waste management on the ecosystem and on the human
right to health became apparent in the 1970’s, with the emergence of strong social
resistance in developed countries, against hazardous waste siting in their local
communities, widely known as the ‘Not In My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) movement.76 Since
then, waste industries have turned to the global market as a way to manage hazardous
wastes, and through many high-profile environmentally catastrophic ship-dumping
incidents (1986 Gonaives Beach, Haiti; 1987 Kokos, Nigeria; 1987 Beirut, Lebanon;
1998 Sihanoukville, Cambodia; 2006 Abidjan, Ivory Coast) the global public has become
acutely aware that pollution from developed countries’ hazardous wastes is externalized
to the poorest and least powerful communities of the world. In effect, the international
waste trade has propelled to the global level, patterns of environmental injustice
witnessed in developed countries, whereby financially, racially and politically
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disadvantaged communities bear a disproportionate burden of hazardous waste
byproducts resulting from various industrial activities.77
As exemplified herewith, global trade flows of electronic waste - the newest and most
threatening form of hazardous waste - have been extensively documented by
transnational non-governmental organizations and environmental sociologists, since the
early 1990’s. Various field studies on the e-waste markets in China, India, Pakistan and
Africa have characterized these growing employment sectors as very acutely endangering
human and ecosystem health. In these transnational business realms, fundamental labour
and human rights, most importantly, to occupational health and safety, social protection,
decent living standards, safe drinking water and environmental health, have not been
upheld. Clearly, the practice of e-waste export not only conflicts with global
environmental objectives, but also contributes to the violation of a broad set of human
rights. This brings us to the focal point of my legal analysis, that is to determine what
regulatory boundaries have been set to mitigate e-waste trade towards developing
countries, given the apparent contention between this global business practice and
contemporary social and environmental norms.
It appears that clear consensus within the international community that rich countries
should not transfer hazardous e-wastes to less-developed countries, and even the
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integration of this principle into international legislation in the form of the Basel
Convention, have had only marginal success in curtailing international e-waste flows
towards crude, pollutive, dangerous recycling networks located in Asia, Africa and Latin
America. Due to definitional ambiguities contained in the Basel Convention regarding
whether or not some electronic wastes qualify as hazardous wastes, along with the
Convention’s failure to regulate certain international transfers of hazardous e-wastes
based on their purported use, global traders are able to move massive quantities of
hazardous e-waste across borders, without any environmental or social constraints. The
weaknesses of the current international legal framework governing hazardous wastes,
with respect to controlling transfers of electronic wastes, are now examined.
Part Two: Regulating the International E-Waste Trade
I. The Basel Convention
The export of hazardous wastes from developed to developing countries had become
common international practice since long before the emergence of the e-waste crisis. By
the 1980’s, a series of toxic trade scandals in which various developed-world industries
were found to be dumping hazardous wastes in developing countries and Eastern Europe,
had been brought to global public attention, largely due to the efforts of international
NGO Greenpeace.78 This prompted governments to begin negotiations for a multilateral
environmental treaty that would regulate international transfers of hazardous substances.
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At a diplomatic conference in 1989, the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal was adopted, its
stated mission to address “the risk of damage to human health and the environment
caused by hazardous wastes[…]”79 and the “growing threat to human health and the
environment posed by the increased generation and complexity, and transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes[…].”80  The Convention came into force in 1992, and
with 172 signatories to date, it still constitutes the primary global legal instrument
regulating the trade of hazardous wastes. During negotiation of the Basel Convention,
many countries demanded a complete global ban on the international trade of hazardous
wastes, but ultimately they only succeeded in establishing a strictly controlled trading
regime, based essentially on the principles of transparency, environmental precaution,
prior informed consent of receiving countries and respect of individual countries’
domestic import prohibitions. In effect, the original Basel regime (agreed upon in 1992)
did not entirely prohibit transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, but instead
allowed these transfers to take place in very limited situations and under strict reporting
conditions outlined in the Convention. Failure of this highly cautionary and strictly
monitored regime to reduce toxic waste flows to developing countries became apparent
immediately after the Convention was adopted.  Although the Basel Convention was
intended to decrease the disposal of hazardous wastes in developing countries, various
exemptions within the Convention resulted in a drastic increase of hazardous waste
exports destined for recycling and reuse. In the case of countries belonging to the
Organization for Economic Development (OECD), figures show that while hazardous
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waste exports for final disposal decreased by 31.1% between 1990 and 1995, hazardous
waste exports destined for recycling and reuse increased by 32% in the same period.81
Responding to fears that hazardous wastes were being dumped in developing countries
under the guise of recycling, in 1995, the parties to the Basel Convention agreed to a
complete ban of all hazardous waste exports - for disposal, recycling and recovery - from
what are known as Annex VII countries (Basel Parties that are members of the OECD,
EU and Lietchtenstein) to non-Annex VII countries (all other Basel Parties).  Exports of
hazardous wastes for disposal were banned as of 22 September 1995, and exports
destined for recycling, recovery and reuse were prohibited as of 31 December 1997.
Adopted as an amendment to the Basel Convention at the third Conference of the Parties
(COP-3), this agreement, formally known as Decision III/1 and commonly known as the
Basel Ban Amendment, has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of Member
States to enter into force. Because the current 64 ratifications to the Basel ban
amendment do not include at least 62 from original parties, it is argued that the
amendment is still not legally enforceable.
The number of ratifications needed for the ban amendment to enter into force remains a
point of contention between Basel Parties, due to ambiguous language used in Article
17(5) of the Convention:
Amendments adopted in accordance with paragraphs 3 or 4 above shall enter into
force between Parties having accepted them on the ninetieth day after the receipt by
the Depositary of their instrument of ratification, approval, formal confirmation or
acceptance by at least three-fourths of the Parties who accepted them[…].
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There are two approaches possible under this provision: the fixed time approach, under
which the ban amendment would enter into force after ratification by 62 of the original
82 parties, or the current time approach, which would require ratifications by at least 128
of the current total 170 parties to the Convention.82 As such, while signatories of the
Basel Ban do have a moral obligation to follow its provisions, it remains legally
unbinding at the international level. Notable non-signatory countries include Canada,
Japan and the United States. The European Union has not only ratified the Basel ban, but
further transposed it domestically into the European Waste Shipment Regulation83. A
statement made by Canada at the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) following the
adoption of the Basel ban amendment, suggests that the government’s primary reason for
non-ratification of the ban is the latter’s potentially disruptive effects on the hazardous
recyclables trade:
Canada agrees that there exists sufficient evidence to warrant acceptance of the
ban amendment relate to hazardous wastes destined for final disposal. Canada
will not authorize any shipments of hazardous wastes for final disposal outside of
the OECD region or for recycling to countries that prohibit such imports.
[…] There will be a need for recycling of hazardous wastes today, tommorow,
and for many years to come.
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Canada finds that there is unsufficient clarity as to which recyclable materials
would be subject to the ban amendment. Therefore it is premature to consider
adoption of a legally binding amendment at this time.84  
In essence, the Basel ban closes a loophole in the original Basel Convention, under which
certain hazardous wastes may be traded for recycling and recovery purposes. The
following sections illustrate the legal necessity of the Basel ban, by examining exactly
where the Basel Convention fails to control the transfer of dangerous wastes to poor
countries.
1. Hazardous Waste Controls of the Basel Convention
The main objectives of the Basel Convention are to minimize the generation of hazardous
wastes, to limit the international movements of these wastes and, more broadly, to
promote national self-sufficiency in waste management.85 The Convention’s definition of
‘hazardous waste’ extends to those wastes listed in Annexes I and VIII of the
Convention, unless they do not exhibit one of the characteristics listed in Annex III
(explosive, flammable, liable to spontaneous combustion, liable to become flammable or
give off flammable gases when in contact with water, oxidizing, poisonous, infectious,
corrosive, toxic or ecotoxic).86 Wastes that do not appear in these Annexes but that are
defined as hazardous wastes under the domestic legislation of an exporting, importing, or
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transit country that is a contracting Party to the Basel Convention, are also recognized as
hazardous wastes.87
Parties to the Convention are obliged to manage and dispose of hazardous wastes in an
environmentally sound manner, which implies treating and disposing wastes as close to
their origin as possible, as well as preventing and minimizing the generation of wastes
and their international movements.88 Parties are required to adopt domestic legislation
aimed at preventing and punishing illegal traffic in hazardous wastes, and are prohibited
from shipping hazardous wastes to and from non-Parties, unless such transfers are
regulated under special bilateral or regional agreements that do not contravene the
provisions of the Basel Convention.89
The Basel Convention affirms that in order to protect human health and the environment,
hazardous wastes should not be traded freely, like ordinary commercial goods. The
Convention establishes a written notification and approval process that is known as the
procedure of prior informed consent (PIC), for all cross-border movements of hazardous
wastes.90 The PIC is essentially a human health and environmental protection measure
based on the principles of prevention and transparency. Under this system, parties are
prohibited from exporting hazardous wastes unless the State of import has consented to
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the shipment beforehand, in writing.91 Furthermore, the State of export cannot approve a
hazardous waste transfer unless it has received prior confirmation from the State of
import, of the existence of a contract between the exporter and disposer, ensuring the
environmentally sound management of the wastes in question.92
In addition to imposing a higher level of environmental legal responsibility on exporters,
importers, transit-country waste dealers and government authorities, with respect to
transfers of hazardous wastes, the Basel Convention establishes specific circumstances
under which Parties are authorized to engage in hazardous waste transfers. Under Article
4(9) of the Basel Convention, Parties are obliged to “take appropriate measures to
ensure” that hazardous wastes are passed through or exchanged between territories only
in the following three situations:
• when the exporting country cannot manage the wastes within its own borders, in
an environmentally sound manner (Art. 4(9)(a)); or
• when “the wastes in question are required as a raw material for recycling or
recovery in the State of import” (Art. 4(9)(b)); or
• under other agreed-upon criteria, so long as they do not contravene the objectives
of the Convention (Art. 4(9)(c)).
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Evidently, the Basel Convention discourages the export of hazardous waste for disposal,
limiting such transfers to when a contracting Party is incapable of handling the waste in
question in an environmentally sound manner within its own territory. At the same time,
there is a clear allowance of hazardous waste transfers between contracting Parties, for
the purposes of recycling and recovery. Of course, Article 4(9)(b) is nuanced by the Basel
Ban Amendment, and therefore inapplicable between Annex VII and non-Annex VII
countries.
In all cases that hazardous waste transfers are permitted, Article 6(3)(b) requires that they
be managed in an environmentally sound manner, and that this fact be clearly established
before the release of a shipment from the exporting State. Of course, the Basel
Convention’s restrictions apply only to ‘hazardous waste’ definitions contained in, or
recognized by the treaty. As such, any control over transboundary movements of
electronic wastes depends on whether or not they are recognized as hazardous waste
under Article 1(a) of the Convention. As we will see in the following passages, the extent
to which electronic wastes are controlled under the Basel Convention remains a legally
contentious aspect of the treaty that has yet to be resolved.
2. E-Waste as Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Wastes: Basel Annexes VIII and IX
Electrical and electronic wastes listed in Annex VIII (entries A1180, A1150, A2010) of
the Basel Convention are considered ‘hazardous waste’ under Article 1.1(a):
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A1150  Precious metal ash from incineration of printed circuit boards
[...]
A1180   Waste electrical and electronic assemblies or scrap containing
components such as accumulators and other batteries included
on list A, mercury switches, glass from cathode-ray tubes and
other activated glass and PCB-capacitators, or contaminated
with Annex I constituents (e.g. cadmium, mercury, lead,
polychlorinated biphenyl) to an extent that they possess any of
the characteristics contained in Annex III (note the related
entry on list B B110)
A 2010   Glass waste from cathode ray tubes and other activated
glasses.93
Annex IX (entry B1110) of the Convention makes a further clarification regarding
electronic wastes, listing those which are generally not considered hazardous wastes:
B1110   Electrical and electronic assemblies:
• Electrical and electronic assemblies consisting of only
   metals or alloys
• Waste electrical and electronic assemblies or scrap not
   containing components such as accumulators and other
   batteries included on list A, mercury switches, glass
   from cathode-ray tubes and other activated glass and
   PCB-capacitators, or not contaminated with Annex I
   constituents (e.g. cadmium, mercury, lead,
       polychlorinated biphenyl) or from which these have
   not been removed, to an extent that they do not possess
   any of the characteristics contained in Annex III (note
   the related entry on list A A1180)
• Electrical and electronic assemblies (including printed
  circuit boards, electronic components and wires)
  destined for reuse, and not for recycling or final
  disposal.94
By virtue of Annex IX, electronic wastes that do not possess hazardous materials are not
considered hazardous wastes. Since most electronics do contain Annex I constituents
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(such as lead, cadmium and mercury), once disposed, they qualify as hazardous waste
under Annex VIII and can only be exported or imported following the PIC procedure.
Furthermore, in light of the Basel Ban Amendment, these hazardous e-wastes cannot be
transferred from Annex VII to non-Annex VII countries. However, the last paragraph of
Annex IX introduces an important exemption with respect to electronics that would
normally be covered under Annex VIII, in stipulating that when destined for direct reuse,
electrical and electronic assemblies and their components do not fall under the ‘hazardous
waste’ definition. As such, it can be understood that when destined for disposal or
recycling, electronic wastes constitute hazardous wastes, and are thus subject to
international transfer restrictions outlined in the Convention (technically, the PIC
procedure). The same category of electronics, when intended for direct reuse, are not
recognized as waste, but instead as commodities, and thus, remain exempt from all
hazardous waste controls. The broad definition of reuse which is provided by Annex IX
suggests that second-hand electronics intended for ‘direct reuse’ does not only refer to
functioning equipment, but may very well include electronics in need of “repair,
refurbishment or upgrading.”95
The exclusion on equipment destined for reuse appears to be compatible with the Basel
Convention’s prime environmental objective (to reduce the generation of waste), as reuse
extends the lifecycle of electronic products. By prolonging the functionality of
electronics, reuse benefits resource and energy conservation, and at least temporarily
diverts the need for recycling or disposal, operations which can be highly damaging to
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the environment and human health. However, as exemplified by Lagos, Nigeria, where an
expansive electronics repair and refurbishment sector has emerged, most electronic
equipment that is exported from industrialized countries for the purpose of re-use requires
some form of intervention before it can become reusable.96
It is essential to point out that while reuse is generally considered to be the most
environmentally–friendly management option for second-hand electronics, it may also be
a significant source of pollution. This is especially the case when repair or refurbishment
are required, as these processes often involve the replacement and disposal of non-
functioning components.97 More importantly, because electronic equipment is not
designed for perpetual reuse, the eventual need for recycling or disposal is inevitable, and
thus it is perhaps more appropriate to qualify reuse as a management option which at
best, delays and reduces the environmental impact of used electronics, but can never
entirely eliminate it.
In summary, it seems that Annex IX of the Basel Convention essentially provides an
opening for the unrestricted international trade of obsolete – and even broken - electronic
products towards developing countries. Post-consumer electronics labeled for reuse
effectively escape the Basel Convention’s strict controls on hazardous wastes, even
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though they may very well qualify as hazardous wastes from scientific, medical and
environmental perspectives.
3. Impact of the Annex IX Reuse Loophole
It is apparent that the reuse exemption was incorporated into the Basel Convention so that
hazardous waste controls did not hinder developing countries’ access to post-consumer
information technology, a second-hand resource which continues to be an essential factor
to their economic growth and social advancement. However, the drafting of the
exemption ultimately created a carte blanche for exporters and importers regarding
environmental responsibility and diligence, as no additional provisions were adopted to
ensure the mandatory pre-testing, labeling or certification of electronics destined for
reuse. As a result, export for re-use, repair and refurbishing has become a portal for
abuse, acting as a legitimate guise for the dumping of hazardous electronics in developing
countries. For example, the Basel Action Network’s investigation of the reuse and repair
trade in Nigeria revealed that that an estimated 75% of electronic equipment shipped to
the region for the purpose of reuse qualified only as waste, presenting no usability
potential whatsoever.98 A 2008 investigation conducted by Greenpeace International
revealed a similar trend of illegal e-waste dumping being carried out in Accra and
Korforidua, Ghana.99
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In light of the Annex IX reuse exemption, the Basel Convention’s regulation of
international transfers of hazardous e-waste appears inconsistent. Hazardous shipments of
electronics, if labeled for repair, may escape all reporting, transport, treatment, storage
and consent requirements applicable to transboundary movements of hazardous wastes,
as second-hand goods are not regulated under the Convention. In this respect, the reuse
exemption provides ample opportunity for exporters and importers of e-waste to avoid
the excessive legal obligations related to the cross-border transport of hazardous wastes.
Due to this aspect of the Convention, its potential to offer a meaningful level of human
health and environmental protection against hazardous e-waste trading, appears severely
limited.
Further impeding the Convention’s effectiveness with respect to mitigating the pollutive
effects of the global e-waste trade, is its affirmation that in some countries, discarded
electrical assemblies and their components intended for reuse “are not considered
wastes.”100 As such, whether or not post-consumer electronics can even be considered
wastes under the Convention, let alone hazardous wastes, remains an open question.   
Definitional uncertainties pertaining to ‘waste’ are perhaps the Convention’s greatest
source of contention between the various stakeholders involved in cross-border waste
transfers. The Basel Convention defines ‘waste’ as substances that are intended or
required by national law to be disposed of, and ‘disposal’ is meant to include final
disposal, as well as resource recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct re-use or alternative
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uses. 101 Thus according to the Basel Convention, hazardous materials intended for either
disposal or recycling are hazardous ‘wastes’, with the exception of the Annex IX
exemptions. However, as Kreuger has pointed out, “industry […] defines materials,
hazardous or not, that are intended for recycling as ‘products’ or secondary raw materials,
that should not be subject to waste regulations.”102 In essence, there is no universal
consensus that hazardous recyclables (such as e-wastes) should be governed by
environmental policy, and not (liberalized) trade policy. The problem is further
exasperated by the general understanding that wastes are in fact  ‘goods’. In a 1968
ruling, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) defined goods as “products which can be
valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial
transactions.”103 In 1992 the ECJ affirmed that wastes, even those posing an
environmental threat, were goods.104 The presence of a strong global market for end-of-
life electronics enhances the challenge of how to impose environmental restrictions
against unsafe transfers of this stream of ‘wastes/products/goods’, without infringing
upon economic policies which call for liberalized trade, or hurting economic and
technological progress in developing countries where there is a great demand for used
electronics.  Evidently, obsolete electronics may constitute waste from an advanced
economy, first-consumer perspective, but they also take on an entirely new meaning
within the international trading regime, as recyclables, raw materials, second-hand goods,
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donations, and gifts. Even though an electronic product may have been discarded by the
initial purchaser, it remains a significant tradable commodity. In fact, the renewal of
product lifecycles between the ‘first world’ and ‘third world’ is not a new concept. One
of the first uses of the term ‘globalization’ was to describe a production process in which
a product went through an initial lifecycle within the developed world, and once obsolete,
it began a second lifecycle in the developing world.105 This brings to light one of the
complexities of actually implementing the Basel Convention, which is that socio-
economic and resource disparities between advanced and developing economies makes it
impossible to reach a global consensus on the definitions of hazardous waste. What is
considered waste in one country may be a highly desired, profitable - albeit potentially
hazardous - resource in another, and consequently, regulators may be compelled to adjust
their national hazardous waste classification lists according to domestic industry needs
rather environmental concern.   
4. Impact of the Basel Ban
With each Member State retaining sovereignty over its national definition of hazardous
wastes, and the Basel Convention itself exempting electronics for reuse from the
hazardous waste classification, the effectiveness of the Convention, and the Basel Ban
Amendment in particular, remains uncertain. If the ban were legally enforceable, it would
still be impossible to prohibit exports of used electronics destined for reuse from Annex
VII to non-Annex VII countries, unless, under the domestic legislation of the countries
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involved in the transaction, the items in question were classified as hazardous wastes.106
In this respect, it is important to note that in Canada and the United States – which
together undeniably form the world’s largest electronics consumption market - assembled
electronics are not classified as hazardous waste.107 Of course, the success of an
international movement of hazardous e-waste from these countries or others, depends on
the importing country’s definition of hazardous waste, and its political will to enforce
import bans, a factor which has been observed to fluctuate according to the level of
development of a country, its role in the global economy, and the availability of resources
within its borders. For instance, China’s popularity as a destination for e-waste exports is
closely linked to it being a resource-poor country, with a large manufacturing sector,
cheap labour conditions and weak rule of law.108 It serves as an example of how the
pressures of industrialization and poverty are able to counteract environmental legislative
measures, which in China, includes a national ban on e-waste imports and ratification of
the Basel ban Amendment.109
With strong economic incentives for developed economies to export e-waste and for
developing economies to import it, legislative bans on trade are seen as likely to increase
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illegal traffic.110 This suspicion has in fact been recently confirmed by the recently
released European Environmental Agency report, which indicates that the number of
illegal e-waste shipments from EU states to non-OECD countries is continuously rising,
despite the fact that the EU is considered to have domestically implemented the Basel ban
through the European Waste Shipment Regulation.111 According to the EEA report, at
least 15 000 tonnes of used television sets were exported from the EU into African
countries in 2005 (the last year for which data was available), with an average of one
thousand units arriving on a daily basis in either Ghana, Nigeria or Egypt.112 The report
emphasizes that used televisions represent only a fraction of actual e-waste exports, the
total quantity of which remains unknown and impossible to estimate accurately, due in
part to the difficulty in determining “when a used electrical or electronic item is waste or
just second-hand.”113 As such, the differentiation between illegal traffic and the legal
trade of electronics remains a complex issue, even under the Basel ban. Furthermore,
there is an undeniable tension between the international electronics trade and the Basel
ban, as the latter may be seen as prohibiting legitimate recyclers in developing countries
from access to the global e-waste recycling market.
It is important to recall here that hazardous e-waste recycling is a lucrative globalized
business. The global recycling industry is valued at an estimated US $160 billion and
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believed to employ roughly 1.5 million individuals.114 The electronic waste industry in
Guiyu alone is valued at US $72 million and considered “a fundamental part of Guiyu’s
economy and society.”115 The impact that true enforcement of the Basel ban might have
on the livelihood of this village and similar ones in China and other developing countries,
remains uncertain.
II. International trade vs. the Basel ban?
Although the Basel Convention and the ban amendment are reflective of broad
international consensus over the fact that affluent countries should not manage their toxic
waste by transferring it to poorer countries, the obvious economic gain derived from
recycling e-waste in developing countries is likely to continue to dim the light on toxic
pollution concerns, in a pattern similar to that of the global electronics manufacturing
industry.116 With most electronic goods being made in China and other developing
nations for reasons of cost efficiency - at the evident expense of human rights and
environmental health - it is not all that striking that these products are also being recycled
in these regions under similar conditions. Sadly, due to global inequalities, the most
pollutive parts of the electronic product lifecycle, namely manufacturing and disposal,
have both been transferred to the developing world. And while there is general
international acknowledgement that this situation, where developing countries are
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assuming the ill-effects of products that have been enjoyed by ‘first world’ consumers, is
a clear manifestation of social and environmental injustice, for many governments and
other stakeholders, it is less clear that the solution to this problem lies in global
ratification of the Basel ban. It has been pointed out that restricting poor nations from the
market of recyclable materials would prohibit them from exercising their comparative
advantage in the recycling industry and thus pose an obstacle to sustainable
development.117 From this perspective, hazardous waste recycling contributes to resource
utilization and income generation in developing countries and a total ban would cause
substantial immediate harm, if no other income alternatives were made available to the
recycling workforce.
In addition to apprehension over the possibly volatile social and economic repercussions
of excluding poor nations from trade in recyclable electronics, there is also concern that
this will lead to increased extraction and processing of raw materials, and further hinder
the transfer of clean technologies to developing economies.118 Moreover, it is argued –
mainly by the global recycling industry119 – that the Basel ban is inconsistent with the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).120 Since the Basel ban prohibits the
trade of hazardous wastes between Annex VII countries and all others, it could be seen as
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an infringement of the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle, a fundamental pillar of the
multilateral trading system according to which members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) are to extend similar trade advantages with all other WTO members.121
In essence, the Basel ban inadvertently allows developed countries to trade recyclable
hazardous wastes exclusively between themselves. For this reason, the ban can be seen as
providing recycling industries in Annex VII countries with exclusive access to a
significant ‘waste product’ market, which includes the largest quantities of electronic
waste. This formation of a closed hazardous waste trading group between Annex VII
countries evidently places the Basel ban in conflict with the WTO’s MFN principle, an
incompatibility which could prove to be problematic for WTO Members that, having
ratified the Basel ban amendment, must comply with both multilateral agreements. While
the question of whether or not WTO rules even apply to hazardous waste remains
unresolved, it is likely that because waste products qualify as moveable items placed in
international commerce, they are covered under WTO Agreements. 122  In fact, the WTO
panel has already had to render a decision in relation to a waste product, specifically
retreaded tyres.123
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In addition, it is unlikely that a circumvention of the MFN clause such as the Basel ban
be tolerated under the general exceptions clause (Article XX GATT), as necessary for
environmental protection:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
[…]
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, plant or health life
[…]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and
consumption.
       (Article XX GATT)
While it is obvious that the imposition of the Basel ban is linked to the negative human
health and environmental effects of hazardous waste recycling as it is normally carried
out in developing countries, it is unclear whether the ban, in the form that it is applied –
that is strictly from Annex VII countries to non-Annex VII countries - is “necessary to
protect human, animal plant or health life.” If the environmental justification for the ban
is that the recycling industries of non-Annex VII countries are incapable of handling
hazardous waste in an environmentally sound manner, then restrictions on international
transfers of hazardous waste should apply between those countries as well. For the
purposes of environmental and human protection, a ban on the importation of all foreign
hazardous waste into developing countries, and not only foreign hazardous waste
originating from Annex VII countries, would seem a more effective measure.
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With respect to Article XX(g) GATT, the Basel ban certainly cannot be justified as a
measure “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” as it restricts
industries in non-Annex VII countries from accessing waste recyclables. This limited
access to post-consumer (secondary) resources is likely to lead to a decrease in resource
conservation activities such as reuse and recycling, and an increased industrial reliance
on the extraction of primary resources.
Another difficulty in accepting the Basel ban as an environmental and human health-
related exemption to international trading rules, is that it imposes a general export
restriction on Annex VII countries, without consideration of those countries’ individual
capacities to process electronic or other hazardous waste. In effect, the Basel ban does not
factor into consideration advancements that have been made through waste treatment
technology transfers to many non-Annex VII countries, nor does it account for the fact
that there may exist similarities between the waste management systems of some Annex
VII and non-Annex VII countries. In doing so, the ban does not appear to meet the
criteria set in the chapeau of Article XX GATT, in that it may be interpreted as
constituting “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail.”
There appears to be an assumption under the Basel ban, that Annex VII countries are
capable of managing their waste in an environmentally sound manner, and that non-
Annex VII countries are not. Realistically however, there exist wide discrepancies in the
environmental sophistication of waste management systems in countries belonging to the
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same group, and even some similarities between countries in opposite groups.124 Under
the Basel ban, non-Annex VII countries that have started to establish environmentally
sound systems for waste management assume a major trade disadvantage, as their
industries continue to be barred from accessing waste recyclables, despite their adoption
of new, ‘greener’ waste technologies.
There are other legal ambiguities of the Basel ban, which point to a potentially vast and
unjustified curtailment of the international trade in waste recyclables. Firstly, it is unclear
whether or not developing countries having improved their environmental performance
and recycling capacity will ever be able join the Annex VII list. The Parties to the
Convention decided to postpone the consideration of new membership applications to the
Annex VII list until the Basel ban came into legal effect,125 a decision which implies that
unless the ban is ratified by a sufficient number of Parties to become legally binding,
non-Annex VII countries will not be able to benefit from wider market access even after
adopting environmentally sound systems for waste management. .
Secondly, there is uncertainty over how the Basel ban affects developing countries’
sovereign right to enter into bilateral and regional agreements, as permitted under Article
11 of the Basel Convention. An Article 11 agreement could allow developing countries
that have adopted environmentally sound technologies for waste management to import
                                                 
124 For examples of international initiatives that are continuously enhancing developing countries’
capacity to manage electronic wastes, see StEP, Annual Report 2008 (Bonn, United Nations
University / StEP, 2008).
125 Guevara, M., supra note 16.
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waste recyclables that would otherwise be prohibited under the Basel ban. While there is
mention of Article 11 of the Basel Convention in the preamble of the ban amendment:
[…]the Technical Working Group will develop technical guidelines to assist any
Party or State that has sovereign right to conclude agreements or arrangements
including those under Article 11 concerning the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes.
there are opposing views among Basel Parties as to its interpretation, with the European
Union arguing that the ban amendment does not confirm the continued availability of
Article 11 agreements.126 Should it be impossible for non-Annex VII countries to
negotiate Article 11 agreements after ratifying the Basel ban, they would lose control
over their sovereign right to determine which waste products may be imported onto their
territories, despite any enhancement in their capacity to manage waste in an
environmentally responsible manner, and regardless of their domestic industries’ needs
for raw materials.
With so many uncertainties regarding the global economic impact of the Basel ban and to
what extent it will restrict international trading in waste recyclables, the amendment
remains controversial and unsupported by several nations, most notably some of the
largest generators of hazardous waste – Canada, United States, Australia and Japan. With
hazardous waste recyclables such as electronic waste, generating much needed revenue in
developing countries while relieving developed countries of the costly burden of having
to manage the waste domestically, the Basel ban amendment is likely to remain
unenforced, unless its many legal ambiguities are addressed.
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III. Assessing the impact of the Basel Convention
 It is difficult to determine how successful the Basel Convention has been in fulfilling its
objectives to minimize international movements of hazardous wastes, and to promote the
environmentally sound management of wastes at their source. While the environmental
treaty is certainly credited for having changed callous international business practices of
hazardous waste dumping in the third world, and for having propelled governments
towards establishing greater transparency, environmental responsibility and
accountability in waste management, the Basel Convention is just as generally considered
to contain a number of key weaknesses that challenge its effectiveness as a
comprehensive global waste management policy.127
Firstly, a common criticism of the Basel Convention is the fluctuation it allows in
Member States’ definitions of hazardous waste.128 Because national definitions of
hazardous waste vary under the Convention, as do Member States’ domestic monitoring
and reporting systems and waste management strategies, it is difficult to determine the
precise legal scope of the Convention and to what degree it is being implemented. This is
especially the case with regards to electronic waste products, most of which, in intact
forms, continue to escape hazardous waste classification in the majority of countries
subject to the Basel Convention.
                                                 
127 See Clapp, J. “Seeping through the Regulatory Cracks”, 22(1) SAIS Review of International
Affairs (2002) 141 –155. See also Kreuger, J., supra note 12; Kummer, K., supra note 12.
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Secondly, the Convention relies primarily on the principle of state responsibility for
monitoring and enforcement, requiring Members to facilitate implementation through the
establishment of competent authorities and focal points (Article 5). Members must submit
annual reports to the Secretariat that provide quantitative and qualitative data on the flow
of transboundary waste shipments in which they were involved, information on any
changes in national hazardous waste regulation, and all other information deemed
relevant under the Convention (Article 13). In this respect, it has been noted that data
submitted to the Secretariat has been of inconsistent quality, with developing countries
often lacking the financial resources, technical expertise, testing facilities, adequate
administrative systems and national infrastructure necessary to comply with the complex
monitoring and reporting obligations of the Basel Convention.129
With respect to the illegal traffic of hazardous wastes, there is no way to estimate the
exactitude of the Secretariat’s figures regarding quantities, routes and frequency of such
shipments, as many Contracting Parties lack the capacity to effectively track
transboundary movements of wastes carried out in contravention of the Convention.130
Domestic deficiencies in border control and inspection continue to pose a clear obstacle
to the fulfillment of one of the Basel Convention’s major objectives, that is reducing
illegal waste shipments.
                                                 
129 Kummer, K., supra note 12. At 81. See also Rummel-Bulska, I., “Compliance with and
enforcement of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal,” Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement, Volume 2. 419-432. (INECE, 1998).
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Thirdly, with regards to enforcement, the legally non-binding supervisory system and
complaint mechanism, which was established at  the 6th Conference of the Parties in
2002, as part of the Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance131 may be
too soft a tool to deal with the problematic issue of illegal traffic. The Compliance
Committee, composed of 15 independent experts (three from each of the five regional
groups of the United Nations) is mandated to assist Parties in the implementation of the
Convention. The Committee considers submissions by any Party related to its own
compliance difficulties or another Party’s failure to comply with the Convention’s
obligations, as well as submissions by the Secretariat relating to a Party’s reporting
obligations, and also conducts general reviews as mandated by the Conference of the
Parties.132 Although the establishment of this Committee was an important breakthrough
with regards to compliance control, as it finally created an independent supervisory body
to conduct substantial reviews of the information transmitted by Contracting Parties to
the Secretariat, and to guide Contracting Parties’ in the technical application of the
Convention, the ultimately negotiable nature of the Committee’s decisions means that
enforcement of the Convention remains largely voluntary.
A major weakness of the current compliance regime is that non-governmental
organizations are altogether excluded from the opportunity to make submissions
                                                 
131 See Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, 6th Meeting Report. UNEP CHW.6/40
(10 February 2003). At 10.
132 UNEP, The Basel Convention Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance
(Paris: UNEP, March 2006).
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regarding breaches of the treaty by Contracting Parties, despite the major role they play
in monitoring and researching environmental injustice, particularly in the field of global
waste traffic, where their activism alone is attributed to have triggered the adoption of
international policy. As the Basel compliance regime exclusively entrusts, to Contracting
Parties alone, the power to initiate action against suspected violations of the
Convention,133 there is a very low probability of such action being taken, as Governments
may fear retaliatory measures for submitting a complaint against another Member.  In
fact, in its latest Report, the Compliance Committee brought attention to the lack of
specific submissions by Parties and the necessity to create incentives in this regard.134 To
date, the Committee has still not received a specific submission from any Contracting
Party.
Alongside these internal weaknesses of the Basel Convention, one external factor in
particular gravely affects the treaty’s ability to control transboundary movements of
hazardous waste, which is that the United States, the world’s largest exporter and
generator of electronic waste,135 has not yet ratified the Convention. While the U.S.
remains legally unbound by the provisions of the Convention, in theory, its hazardous
waste policies should be no less environmentally sound than the Basel Convention, as it
                                                 
133 Id. Chapter II, 1(1)(b).
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has entered into bilateral waste agreements136 with several Basel Parties (Costa Rica,
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines and Canada). By virtue of Article 11 of the Basel
Convention, these agreements are:
[…] not supposed to derogate from the environmentally sound management of
hazardous waste and other wastes as required by this Convention […] in
particular taking into account the interest of developing countries.
In reality however, there exist great discrepancies between the U.S. federal hazardous
waste export policy and ‘environmentally sound waste management’ as called for under
the Basel Convention.
The United States’ Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) actually
encourages the export of hazardous wastes, by exempting the federal Environmental
Protection Agency from the obligation to ensure that hazardous wastes exported for
recycling or recovery will be treated in an environmentally sound manner.137 This is
contrary to Article 6(3)(b) of the Basel Convention, which provides that an export of
                                                 
136 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Other Waste
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137 For a discussion of the U.S. hazardous waste exemptions, See Billinghurst, B.M., “E-Waste: A
Comparative Analysis of Current and Contemplated Management Efforts by the European Union
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hazardous wastes can only take place if there is confirmation from the State of import
that the waste will be managed in an environmentally sound manner. In essence, the
recycling exemption allows the U.S. recycling industry to export hazardous waste to any
foreign destination, without any requirements as to how that waste is to be handled. This
means that Canada, when exporting hazardous wastes to the United States, cannot ensure
that if the shipment is subsequently exported from the United States to another country
for recycling purposes - which is the fate of approximately 80% of the e-waste the U.S.
receives138 - that it will be managed in an environmentally sound manner. In this sense,
exporting hazardous waste to the United States may allow Canada and other Basel Parties
to sidestep their obligations under the Basel Convention.
My analysis of the Basel Convention shows that while the treaty aims to minimize
international movements of hazardous wastes, this objective has not been achieved with
respect to electronic waste. With the classification of e-waste as hazardous waste
remaining unclear from a legal perspective, and furthermore, the Basel Convention
providing export exemptions on electronic equipment destined for reuse, the treaty does
not seem to provide a coherent global e-waste policy. Moreover, there is serious doubt as
to the potential of the Basel ban amendment to control electronic waste flows towards
developing nations, particularly in light of the EEA and British EPA studies139 which
indicate that even in the European Union, a region which both possesses environmentally
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sound recycling technologies and where the Basel ban amendment is considered to have
been implemented, the illegal traffic of electronic wastes is an ongoing reality.
IV. Beyond the Basel Ban
Aware of the shortcomings of the Basel Convention and the Basel ban amendment to
effectively put an end to e-waste trade flows towards developing countries, the
international community has recently turned its attention away from the question of trade
restrictions and more towards capacity building, placing greater emphasis on providing
multistakeholder assistance to emerging economies in their adoption of environmentally
sound e-waste management systems, and encouraging developed countries to switch to
clean technology in electronic product design.
Building the capacity of developing countries to manage wastes in an environmentally
sound manner is in fact one of the objectives of Agenda 21,140 the multilaterally agreed
upon global plan of action for sustainable development which was adopted at the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit).
According to Agenda 21, a country’s capacity refers to its “human, scientific,
technological, organizational, institutional and resource capabilities.”141 The process of
capacity building can be seen as enhancing a country’s developmental scope and outlook
by strengthening its ability to understand “environmental potentials and limits and […]
                                                 
140 Agenda 21 : Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Agenda Item 21, UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992).
141 Id., Chapter 37, para.1.
69
needs as perceived by the people”142 and providing access to the necessary tools and
resources for it to govern accordingly, towards sustainability. Agenda 21 specifically
points out developing countries’ lack of capacity in the realm of environmentally sound
technologies:
[…] There is a need for favourable access to and transfer of environmentally
sound technologies, in particular to developing countries, through supportive
measures that promote technology cooperation and that should enable transfer of
necessary technological know-how as well as building up of economic, technical,
and managerial capabilities for the efficient use and further development of
transferred technology.[…]
                                                                                           (Agenda 21, Chapter 34)
The incapacity of developing countries with respect to the environmentally sound
management of electronic wastes was the central concern of the 8th Conference of the
Parties to the Basel Convention (COP 8) held in Nairobi, where the first-ever World
Forum on E-waste took place. The outcome of this meeting was the Nairobi Declaration
on the Environmentally Sound Management of Electrical and Electronic Waste143 and
COP Decision VIII/2: Creating Innovative Solutions Through the Basel Convention for
the Environmentally Sound Management of Electrical and Electronic Wastes.144
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143 Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, Eighth meeting (COP-8), Nairobi
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144 Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, Eighth meeting (COP-8), Decision VIII/2:
Creating innovative solutions through the Basel Convention for the environmentally sound
management of electrical and electronic wastes, Nairobi, 1 December 2006.
70
The Nairobi Ministerial Declaration outlines the following guiding principles for global
e-waste management: worldwide promotion of e-waste awareness, transfer of
technologies for environmentally sound waste management from developed to
developing countries, and the promotion of green design, which implies phasing out the
use of toxic substances in the manufacturing of electronics, and adopting product
stewardship and producer responsibility policies for managing electronics at their end-of-
life. In its preamble, the Declaration addresses the issue of international e-waste trading
in an objective manner, acknowledging the human and environmental health risks
associated with international e-waste traffic towards countries that do not have the
capacity for environmentally sound waste management, while also highlighting the socio-
economic opportunities that are created through proper e-waste recycling and recovery.
Decision VIII/2 mandates a Working Group to monitor global developments in e-waste
management, to draft technical guidelines on the environmentally sound management of
e-wastes, and further urges Contracting Parties to increase their financial support and
practical engagement towards fulfilling the objectives of the Nairobi Declaration, in
particular through the development of pilot projects on environmentally sound collection,
reuse, recycling and refurbishment operations in developing countries. The Decision also
urges Parties to ensure that electronics donated internationally are not end-of-life, and to
strengthen efforts in combating illegal traffic.
In essence, the approach to global e-waste management undertaken at COP-8 removed
the controversial Basel ban from the center of international political attention. This shift
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in governance strategies, from the tightening of legal restrictions on trade to the
elaboration of global multistakeholder partnerships in e-waste management, is not
surprising considering the deadlock that had been reached on various aspects of the Basel
ban, such as its compatibility with the international waste recyclables trading regime, the
number of ratifications required for the ban to enter into force, the availability of Article
11 bilateral agreements to Contracting Parties having ratified the ban, and possibilities to
amend the seemingly rudimentary and over-generalized system of country classification
as Annex VII or non-Annex VII. Nevertheless, the main objective of the Basel ban - that
is the safeguarding of developing countries from richer countries’ hazardous wastes -
remains a primary goal of the Basel Convention regime.
As I discussed earlier on, the protection of the developing world population from
advanced economies’ hazardous wastes is primordial to the effective recognition of a
range of internationally recognized fundamental human rights, such as the right to health
and to a healthy environment. Additionally, limitations on the transboundary movements
of e-waste can also be viewed as being an essential, inherent component to the realization
of the overarching principles of environmentally sound waste management, which are
national self sufficiency and waste minimization.145  The inability of a country to manage
hazardous wastes self-sufficiently implies that the consumption habits of its domestic
population remain uncontrolled, causing an externalization of harm to human and
environmental health.
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While it is true that there is a lucrative global market for recyclable and reusable
hazardous wastes, we cannot assert that economic growth resulting from the trade of
hazardous wastes to developing countries balances out its detrimental effects, as the
scope of risk that is posed to human health and the environment through the waste trade
are novel and continuously emerging. With recent academic research findings suggesting
that leaded electronic waste exported from the United States is used as a source material
for lead-contaminated jewelry purchased in the United States,146 it is slowly becoming
clear that the damaging health effects of the hazardous e-waste trade, which have thus far
been mainly associated with recycling workers in developing countries, present a far
more expansive human risk, as they may be subsequently transferred to all those who use
products which have been manufactured from recuperated e-waste components. In this
respect, the continuation of e-waste export to countries that lack the capacity for
environmentally sound recycling and recovery constitutes a potential health risk to the
entire global consumer market, as well as to other stakeholders such as production-chain
workers who manipulate the secondary raw materials extracted from e-waste in the in-
between phases of the product lifecycle. As such, the restriction of e-waste trading to
countries with proper capacity and waste technology is a necessary step in preventing
cyclical patterns of damage to human health and the environment. However, the
restriction of trade alone cannot eliminate the toxic environmental effects of e-waste
recycling in developing countries, nor can it help control the growing quantities of e-
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waste that is continually being generated worldwide. The strength of the Nairobi
Declaration on e-wastes is that it brings to light the ultimately secondary importance of
trade restrictions, as compared to waste reduction and clean production policies, in the
achievement of global goals to limit transboundary movements of hazardous waste.
1. Green Production & Lifecycle Thinking
As long as toxic substances are being used in international manufacturing processes, the
global community will have to address the controversial issue of where they these toxics
should be recycled or disposed, once the product in question has reached its end-of-life. If
e-waste recycling industries are to follow in the steps of manufacturing, and other labour-
intensive industries, it is very likely they will continue to migrate towards developing
countries, for reasons of cost-effectiveness. Unless multilaterally agreed upon restrictions
on transboundary movements of hazardous waste are combined with the adoption of
domestic measures in all stakeholder countries, aimed at eliminating the toxic
characteristics of electronic products, minimizing national e-waste generation and
establishing mandatory and environmentally sound recycling schemes, there is slight
hope for e-wastes to escape the common trend of many other waste commodities traded
in the global market, which is to navigate towards cheaper labour and lower
environmental standards. While there is firm recognition amongst developing countries
that prohibiting toxic waste imports is necessary for the protection of human health and
the environment, the main problem is that these governments do not have the necessary
legal framework, human resources, technical capacity or infrastructure to effectively
monitor and enforce import bans on hazardous wastes which they have adopted through
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the Basel Convention or regional treaties such as the Bamako147 and Waigani148
Conventions.  International capacity building efforts that address these issues play an
essential role in preventing the continuation and aggravation of toxic harm to developing
world communities, but these measures alone are ineffective in reducing the dramatically
increasing global flows of e-waste. In essence, the source of the e-waste problem is not
international trade, it is the use of hazardous substances in the manufacturing of
electronic commodities and the rapid rate at which these goods are consumed. Any
attempts, through the Basel Convention or otherwise, to mitigate the harmful effects of e-
waste by controlling trade flows and processing methods, do not offer a solution to the
core environmental dilemma presented by the global prevalence of electronics, which
concerns the materials used and quantities consumed. The key to global e-waste
management lies first and foremost in ecological intervention at the product design level,
specifically the elimination of the use of hazardous substances in production processes. In
fact, without environmental management at this point of the electronic product lifecycle,
the materialization of hazardous waste reduction goals embedded in the Basel
Convention and various regional environmental treaties would remain theoretical, as the
global consumption of electronics is a continuously rising phenomenon and is expected to
remain so.149
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A salient feature of the Nairobi Declaration on E-Wastes is that it places particular
emphasis on the importance of adopting a lifecycle approach to e-waste management.
This strategy essentially implies that stakeholders, in their decision-making, pay attention
to the environmental burdens of electronics throughout the entire physical existence of
the latter – from raw material to waste - and not strictly to those environmental burdens
directly related to the production or consumption phase in which they are involved:
[Life cycle thinking] embodies a view of products as sources of environmental
problems. It also implies that organizations are not only responsible for
environmental damage due to their own physical activities, but also for a broader
range of environmental interventions throughout the product chain.150
As such, lifecycle thinking creates new linkages between actors involved in the separate
phases of a product system, allowing for the conceptualization of new forms of
stakeholder responsibility and accountability with regards to pollution prevention. In
particular, the lifecycle approach centers on the principle of extended producer
responsibility, an environmental policy principle that can be broadly defined as:
the concept that manufacturers and importers of products bear a degree of
responsibility for the environmental impacts of their products throughout the
products’ life-cycles, including upstream impacts inherent in the selection of
materials for the products, impacts from manufacturers’ production process itself,
and downstream impacts from the use and disposal of the products. Producers
accept their responsibility when they design their products to minimize the life-
cycle environmental impacts and when they accept legal, physical or economic
responsibility for the environmental impacts that cannot be eliminated by
design.151
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EPR is widely recognized as a principle which underlies different types of preventive
environmental policies.152 In essence, the EPR principle extends manufacturers’
responsibility for a product beyond the production process, throughout the wider product
cycle. It is considered an extension of the polluter pays principle, outlined in Principle 3
of the Rio Declaration, according to which the polluter should bear the cost of pollution.
In practice, EPR is implemented through policy instruments which may be
administrative (e.g. collection or take-back of products, fulfillment of reuse and recycling
targets and environmental standards), economic (e.g. product taxes, subsidies, advance
disposal fee systems, tradable recycling credits), or informative (e.g. marking and
labelling of product components, provision of information to consumers and recyclers
about substances used and requirements for environmental disposal, consultation with
local government on collection systems).153  EPR-based policies fulfill their ultimate
objectives of waste minimization and environmental design through the assignation of
four different types of responsibilities to product manufacturers : the assumption of
financial responsibility for treatment required at end-of-life, physical responsibility for
collection at end-of-life, information responsibility with respect to environmental
disposal, and liability in case of pollution proven to be caused by improper disposal.154
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By viewing producers as waste-generating firms and encouraging them to take on greater
responsibility for the overall environmental impact of their products, EPR-based policies
cast waste minimization as one of the major goals of industrial production. The notion of
taking into consideration the effects of the waste phase of a product before it is even
materialized represents a fundamental shift from traditional approaches to waste
management under which wastes are dealt with only after they are generated. In this
sense, the EPR principle effectively extends the main focus of environmental policy and
regulation from the traditionally limited scope of by-products, to include products as
well. Another change brought upon by the adoption of EPR-based policies is that the
financial and physical responsibility for waste management that has traditionally
belonged to local governments, is transferred, either entirely or in part, to the private
sector. By extending waste management responsibilities to producers, EPR policies create
economic incentives for industry to move towards waste minimization. And being a
waste minimization strategy firmly anchored in environmental design rather than the
reduction of industrial production, the EPR approach cannot be criticized to have an
innately negative impact on trade growth. On the contrary, EPR can be seen as a way to
materialize sustainable development goals, as it allows trade within the constraints
necessary to protect human and environmental health. However, that is not to say that
EPR initiatives cannot be poorly designed or cannot fail to meet their objectives. The first
legislative EPR initiative, which took place in Germany and covered packaging wastes,155
was heavily criticized for not taking into consideration limits in national recycling
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capacity, and consequently resulting in increased waste exports to Asia.156 The more
recent EU-wide EPR legislation for end-of-life vehicles (EOLV Directive) has drawn
concerns that its implementation is too costly for the automotive industry, without
presenting any profitability potential or providing design-for-remanufacturing
incentives.157 Adoption of the directive has also been linked to an increase in illegal car
dismantling activities and second-hand export to developing countries.158 As discussed
hereon, similar concerns have also been manifested with regard to EPR legislation
pertaining to end-of-life electronics. In fact, the environmental and financial costs and
benefits of EPR implementation in the electronics sector have not been evident or
uniform. While the EPR principle certainly presents great potential for reducing the
environmental harms of electronic products, identifying the elements necessary for an
EPR programme to fulfill its objectives of cleaner production and waste reduction
remains a significant challenge.
2. Extended producer responsibility and E-Waste
Many countries have developed environmental policies based on the principle of
extended producer responsibility to deal with domestic e-waste generation. However,
government intervention in this regard has been remarkably varied. Stringent regional
and national legal norms have been adopted in the European Union, Japan, Switzerland
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and even certain newly-industrializing countries such as China, on mandatory e-waste
recycling and on the restriction of the use of hazardous substances in new electronic
products. In contrast, e-waste management initiatives in Canada and the United States
have been mainly voluntary and industry-led, or regulated strictly at the provincial or
State level, with an absence of environmental e-waste legislation at the federal level.
The distinct national approaches to e-waste management and to the interpretation and
application of the principle of extended producer responsibility provide an interesting
point of analysis, through which we may better understand the role of government
regulation in minimizing the environmental life-cycle impacts of electronic products.
Important questions arise in the discussion of EPR implementation within the electronics
sector: Are legislative EPR policies more successful than voluntary initiatives at fully
engaging producers and rendering them proficient in waste management? How do
stakeholder responsibility and accountability differ between EPR programs? What are the
financial and environmental side effects of a poorly designed EPR program? Should EPR
programs be implemented at a local, national or international level? How do EPR
programs affect the illegal traffic of e-wastes?
In the following section, I attempt to answer these questions by providing a qualitative
overview of EPR policies that have emerged in response to the e-waste crisis, specifically
from the European Union, Japan, Canada, the United States and China. My goal is to
comparatively assess the main environmental, economic and social effects of  existing  e-
waste management strategies, in order to comprehend their respective implications for the
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international e-waste trading regime, for human and environmental health and for the
global development of green technologies.
Part Three: The Product Policy Approach to E-Waste Management
I.  European Union Law: WEEE and RoHS Directives
The EU has coupled its Basel Convention commitments with two directives adopted in
2002, tackling the e-waste problem at different points of the electronic product lifecycle.
The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive and Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS)
Directive, which both entered into force in 2003, resulted from a resolution of the
European Parliament adopted in 1996, requesting the European Commission to propose
directives based on the principle of producer responsibility, for the management of
certain priority waste streams.159 The main objective of the WEEE directive is to prevent
the generation of e-waste, and to hold producers responsible for the recycling,
reprocessing and safe disposal of electronic equipment falling under any of the ten (10)
product categories found in Annex IA of the Directive (large household appliances, small
household appliances, information technology and telecommunications equipment;
consumer equipment; lighting equipment; electrical and electronic tools; toys, leisure and
sports equipment; medical devices; monitoring and control instruments; and automatic
dispensers).160 The RoHS Directive compliments the WEEE directive, by creating
environmental obligations for producers with regards to the design and manufacturing
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phases of electronic products. In particular, the RoHS directive bans the use of six (6)
hazardous substances (lead, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated biphenyls
(PBB) and polybrominated biphenyl ethers (PBDE)) in all product categories described
in Annex 1A of the WEEE directive, with the exception of medical devices and
monitoring and control instruments (Categories 8 and 9). The exception for the latter was
made due to uncertainties regarding the long-term effect and reliability of lead-free
solder, and the potentially devastating impact of the failure of these types of products in
their application.161 As I will discuss further on, the EU’s RoHS directive has greatly
transformed the global electronics industry, as all foreign manufacturers who export EEE
into the EU, or who manufacture components for EEE that is destined for sale in the EU,
have also been significantly affected by the restrictions.  Before examining the producer
responsibility principle as set forth in the RoHS Directive, I would like to address how
the principle has been applied within the WEEE Directive, which is the policy dealing
with already existing amounts of e-waste.
1. Producer Responsibility in the WEEE Directive
The WEEE directive imposes responsibility for the environmentally sound management
of e-waste on producers of EEE. The definition of ‘producer’ under the WEEE Directive
covers manufacturers and brand-owners of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE),
and persons who, on a professional basis, import or export EEE into a Member State,
irrespective of the selling technique used, including distance communication (telephone
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and web-based sales).162 Producer identification is an essential aspect to the responsibility
regime. Article 11(2) of the WEEE directive requires that for new products (i.e. put on
the market after 13 August 2005) the producer be clearly identifiable by a mark on the
appliance. The WEEE logo (found under Annex IV of the WEEE directive) must also
appear on all electronic equipment placed on the market after 13 August 2005.163
In general, producer responsibility is suggested to begin from collection facilities
onwards, and not directly from the end-users of EEE.164 As such, the WEEE Directive
obligates producers to finance the collection, recycling, recovery and environmentally
sound disposal of waste. The nature and scope of responsibility depends on whether the
product in question is new waste (placed on the market after 13 August 2005) or
historical waste (placed on the market before 13 August 2005), and whether it qualifies as
‘WEEE from private households’, a term that also includes WEEE from commercial,
industrial, institutional and other sources that is similar in nature and quantity to private
household WEEE.165
Two forms of producer responsibility appear in the WEEE directive: collective and
individual. For new products, (i.e. put on the market after 13 August 2005), each
producer is responsible “for financing the operations […] relating to the waste from his
                                                 
162 WEEE directive, supra note 19. Article 3(i).
163 Id., Article 10(3).
164 Ibid., Preamble, Recital 20.
165 Ibid., Article 3(k).
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own products”, for WEEE from private households as well as WEEE from users other
than private households.166 An additional producer responsibility in relation to WEEE
from private households, is the provision of a financial guarantee for every new product
on the market, that is meant to ensure end-of-life treatment. Essentially, with the
placement of every new product on the market, producers are obliged to provide a
recycling insurance, blocked bank account or participate in some form of WEEE
management scheme, to show that the end-of-life management of the new product will be
financed. There is no requirement of a financial guarantee for WEEE from users other
than private households. As for products put on the market before 13 August 2005, they
are referred to under the WEEE directive as historical waste, and in the case of WEEE
from private households, the responsibility for financing their end-of-life management is
assumed collectively, by all producers “existing on the market when the respective costs
occur […] in proportion to their respective share of the market by type of equipment.”167
This is done through a collective scheme. In the case of WEEE from users other than
private households, producers are jointly responsible for financing the costs of
management, alongside users.168
Producer responsibility under the WEEE directive also extends to information regarding
end-of-life treatment of electronics. For each new type of EEE, producers are required to
provide manuals or electronic media detailing all relevant reuse and treatment
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information that may be required by recycling facilities, including disclosure of EEE
components and materials, and location of dangerous substances.169
2. Government Role in WEEE Management
The WEEE directive grants Member States an important regulatory and facilitating role
in WEEE management. Member States are obliged to set up WEEE collection and
financing systems under which customers and distributors may return e-waste at least free
of charge.170 Member States are expected to keep a registry of producers of EEE and
collect information on the annual quantities of electronic products placed on the market,
collected, recycled, and exported.171 They are also obliged to encourage design and
production of electronics “which take into account and facilitate dismantling and
recovery, in particular, the reuse and recycling of WEEE, their components and
materials.”172
3. Consumer Information in the WEEE Directive
The Directive points out the fundamental importance of the separate collection of WEEE
to its environmentally sound management, by noting that Member States play a crucial
role in setting up public collection points, actively engaging consumers to return WEEE
and adopting measures to minimize disposal of WEEE into municipal waste streams.173
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The legislation also provides Member States with an initial separate collection target rate
of 4kg per inhabitant per year of WEEE from private households, which is supposed to
have been reached by 31 December 2006.174 A recent proposal for a revised WEEE
directive, presented by the European Commission in December 2008, provides a new
WEEE collection target rate of 65% of the average amount of EEE placed on the market
in the two preceding years. The change was proposed following concerns that the 4kg per
inhabitant rate did not reflect the economies of individual Member States, leading to
“sub-optimal targets for some countries and too ambitious targets for others.”175
As mentioned earlier, the WEEE directive provides consumers with a right to return
WEEE free of charge.176 In this regard, Article 10 obliges Member States to provide users
with information pertaining to: the safe disposal of WEEE, the availability of return and
collection systems, the consumer role in environmentally-sound e-waste management and
the potential environmental and human health effects of hazardous substances contained
in electronic equipment. As well, under Article 10 Member States are expected to adopt
measures to encourage consumer participation in WEEE collection. However, paragraph
4 of Article 10 allows Member States to transfer all or some of their responsibilities with
respect to consumer information onto producers or distributors.  In a report on the
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implementation of the WEEE directive, it was noted that most Member States have in
fact assigned these consumer information responsibilities to producers.177
4. WEEE Directive Criticisms and Problems of Implementation
Comparing the roles of various stakeholders as outlined in the WEEE directive, it is
evident that the deepest economic engagement in e-waste management is expected from
the producers of EEE. This shift in waste management responsibility under the WEEE
Directive, from being mainly governmental to fully committing the private sector,
provides important economic incentives to producers to design environmentally sound
products that are easy to manage at end-of-life. However, even though the EU legislative
initiative has certainly provided a starting point for the creation of an environmentally
sound electronics market, it has also been met with criticism, mainly for having been
adopted without the input of small manufacturers, for not implementing higher recycling
targets and for possibly encouraging illegal export by not legally obliging producers to
use their recuperated recycled materials.178
In essence, Article 6 of the WEEE Directive, which addresses treatment systems, requires
that e-waste be handled by producers or third parties acting on their behalf, using the
“best available treatment, recycling and recovery techniques” without elaborating on the
subsequent use of treated WEEE.  The proper treatment of e-waste remains an
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outstanding issue within the EU, as only 33% of WEEE is considered to be officially
collected and treated in conformity with the WEEE Directive, with 54% receiving
substandard treatment within the EU or through export, and the remaining 13% going to
landfills.179  Along with the problems of continued illegal export and substandard
domestic treatment of WEEE, a general lack of enforcement of the Directive and the
operational issues that are discussed hereon, regarding implementation of the principle of
producer responsibility, have emerged as major challenges to the effectiveness of the EU
WEEE regime.
Producer Definition
Perhaps the most prominent unresolved issue with the implementation of the WEEE
Directive is the lack of clarity over the definitional scope of ‘producer’. Specifically,
Article 3(i)(iii) of the Directive leaves open to interpretation whether it refers to
importers and exporters in the context of intra-EU trade, or solely in the context of trade
with countries outside the EU. In most EU Member States (22), in the absence of a
manufacturer, the first importer of EEE into the national State (e.g. wholesaler,
distributor, retailer) is considered to be the producer.180 Under this approach, the producer
changes each time an EEE product crosses national borders, for example, from a
wholesaler in one EU Member State to a retailer in another EU Member State.
Consequently, there may be many producers identified for one product. This could pose a
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problem with respect to certain producer responsibility obligations, as multiple producers
may be subjected to financial guarantees (Article 8) and marking requirements (Article
11) for the same product. Aside the excessive costs and administrative burden this
implies, there is also the question of whether identifying wholesalers and distributors as
producers is meaningful to achieving production-related environmental goals, given their
lack of implication in this phase of the product lifecycle. It remains unclear how these
actors are supposed to fulfill the WEEE Directive’s producer responsibility obligations
relating to product design and environmental performance.
Collection Responsibilities
Another problematic aspect of the current WEEE Directive is that although producers are
deemed responsible for the treatment of WEEE from collection points onwards, the
physical and financial responsibilities for collection of WEEE from private households to
collection points are not specifically allocated to producers. In some Member States,
these responsibilities are entirely assumed by local municipalities, in others it is also
shared by EEE producers and distributors.181  Arrangements where the costs of WEEE
collection are allocated to the general public, and not just to users and producers of EEE,
seem to deviate from the polluter pays principle that is explicitly referred to in paragraph
1 of the preamble of WEEE Directive and according to which those who cause
environmental pollution should assume the costs to prevent, eliminate and compensate
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such damage.182 The implication of municipalities in WEEE collection has also been
identified as a potential disincentive to the development of individual-producer collection
systems, as small-scale producers may not have access to the same infrastructure,
government subsidies and other financial resources as municipalities do, to manage
collection sites.183
Individual Financial Responsibility
Article 8(2) of the WEEE Directive is clear in its requirement that for WEEE generated
by private households, producers take on individual financial responsibility for waste
management related to their own products put on the market after 13 August 2005. This
obligation has not been unanimously transposed by Member States into domestic law. A
review of legislative texts revealed that in at least 11 Member States184 producers were
not explicitly assigned individual financial responsibility with respect to new products.185
In some of these cases individual financial responsibility is presented as an option,
otherwise only a general collective financial responsibility can be derived from the
ambiguous language that is used. The legislation of Ireland in particular contradicts the
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WEEE Directive on this point, as it exempts producers belonging to a “approved body”
from having to assume any financial responsibility with respect to WEEE.186
In addition to national legislative texts where individual financial responsibility for new
WEEE is not clear, there are at least eight (8) Member States whose legislation
transposing the WEEE Directive does not address this producer obligation.187 Evidently,
holding producers collectively financially responsible for waste management related to
their new products does not present the same environmental design and clean production
incentives as does the allocation of individual financial responsibility. These type of
WEEE management strategies are in fact disadvantageous to producers with greater
environmental performance and even hinder the expansion of green technologies, thus
undermining the very purpose of the WEEE Directive.
 Administrative Burdens from a Lack of Harmonization
For producers, practical implementation of the WEEE Directive has proven to be an
administrative challenge, as a lack of harmonization between the national registers of
Member States has introduced varying requirements which unnecessarily complicate
their reporting duties. Variations between Member States’ transposition of the WEEE
Directive are not only limited to form, but are also substantial, extending to their
definitions of ‘producer’ and other key terms of the Directive such as ‘WEEE from
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private households’ and ‘put on the market’. Additionally, the lack of harmonization with
respect to the registration requirements of distance-sellers and other foreign entities has
presented a situation where some producers may not be registered in any Member State,
and are consequently excluded from having to assume WEEE management
responsibilities altogether.
5. The new WEEE proposal
In December 2008, a new WEEE proposal was tabled by the European Commission, to
address practical problems that had emerged in the first years of implementation of the
WEEE Directive. The proposal for a revised WEEE Directive aims to remove
unnecessary administrative obstacles and reduce implementation costs for market actors
and regulators, to set higher recycling and reuse targets and improve effectiveness of the
Directive through strengthened monitoring and enforcement. Changes proposed by the
EC include a harmonized system of producer registration and reporting featuring inter-
operational national registers, clarification on the scope of products covered by the
WEEE Directive through a future comitology188 decision that would categorize
appliances as household (business to consumer) or non-household (business to business),
set minimum standards for inspection and introduce monitoring requirements for WEEE
destined for shipment. The most substantial change introduced by the new proposal
relates to the extension of producers’ financial responsibilities in the collection of WEEE.
While reaffirming that producers must finance collection from collection facilities,
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legislation on the Community level, notably through the assistance of an appointed Committee.
See EU Treaty, Art. 202.
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recycling, recovery and disposal of WEEE, the new proposal identifies this as a minimum
standard for responsibility, stating that:
Member States should encourage producer to take full ownership of the WEEE
collection in particular by financing the collection of WEEE throughout the whole
waste chain, including from private households, in order to avoid leakage of
separately collected WEEE to sub-optimal treatment and illegal exports, to create a
level playing field by harmonizing producer financing across the EU, to shift
payment for the collection of this waste from general tax payer to the consumers of
EEEs in line with the polluter pays principle.189
Additionally, Article 12 of the WEEE Proposal stipulates that “Member States, where
appropriate, shall encourage producers to finance all the cost occurring for collection
facilities for WEEE from private households.”  It can be said that by calling on producers
to assume greater responsibility for the lifecycle treatment of their own products,
specifically, by financing collection from households, the new WEEE proposal
strengthens the linkage between the production and post-consumption phases of the
consumer electronics market and reflects a truer coherence with the polluter pays
principle.  At the same time, the social and environmental benefits of holding producers
financially responsible for WEEE collection and treatment throughout the whole product-
waste chain largely depends on what persons, natural or legal, can be identified as
producers, and even more so, on producers’ access to post-consumption electronics. In
this respect, there seems to be a loophole in both the current and proposed versions of the
WEEE Directive, as certain market actors who participate in the collection and treatment
of post-consumer EEE to make a profit from the resale of recovered precious metals, do
not fall under the scope of the legislation. As such, these actors are not obliged to respect
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the treatment standards set out in the WEEE Directive, nor do they have to fulfill
collection and recycling targets, registration requirements, or reporting obligations on
volumes collected and treated. Since the WEEE proposal does not obligate consumers to
discard their used EEE through the official post-consumption channels that are set forth
and regulated by the Directive, there is no way to guarantee that producers will have
access to all the EEE they have placed on the market, once it has been consumed. In fact,
even though both the current Directive and the new proposal hold producers responsible
for financing operations from at least collection points, there is no obligation on
municipalities to transfer all collected WEEE back to producers or third parties acting on
their behalf, for subsequent treatment. In practice however, holding producers responsible
for financing WEEE collection from households may prove to be an ineffective measure
to ensure the proper treatment of WEEE if there is not a concomitant obligation on
consumers, businesses and municipalities to return WEEE to producers or to entities
acting on their behalf, for subsequent treatment. The current and proposed WEEE
regimes do not account for the fact that an unknown amount of WEEE is recycled outside
the producer-funded systems.
It is essential for a prospective WEEE regime to ensure that businesses, consumers and
municipalities do not transfer discarded electronics to unregulated market actors. Unless
all actors that collect and treat WEEE are included under the scope of the WEEE
Directive, the problems of illegal shipment and substandard treatment cannot be
effectively controlled. Nevertheless, the proposed legislation is an important starting
point for an internalization of the costs of the electronics industry. Requiring that
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producers assume financial responsibility for collection from private households in
addition to fulfilling collection, recycling and reuse targets, as well as financing treatment
from collection facilities, may provide the necessary incentive for them to ensure that
unscrupulous market actors do not get hold of WEEE.
Operational issues aside, the EU legislative measures on e-waste and the restriction of
hazardous substances in electronics form a new era of governance and accountability, in
which the EU is clearly acting as an agency for the social and environmental control of
the global market economy, even influencing private firms and policies beyond its
borders. In comparison to other countries’ efforts, which are examined herewith, the EU
still stands ahead in terms of controlling regional levels of e-waste and mitigating
environmental harms.
II. China Laws: RoHS and WEEE Laws
Following the European RoHS Directive, China came out with its own RoHS legislation
that came into force on 1 March 2007.190 Although both laws address the same six toxic
substances, the China RoHS policy is significantly different from the EU RoHS
Directive, mainly because it does not prohibit the use of these hazardous substances in
EEE production, it simply requires that producers and importers indicate the names and
content levels of the toxic substances contained in a product, and provide information to
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users on the ‘environment-friendly use-period’ and recyclability of the product.191 The
scope of the laws is also different, with the China RoHS covering a generally broader
scope of products than the European RoHS, including automotive electronics, radar
systems, medical equipment, all types of electronic components, as well as packaging and
certain raw materials. At the same time, while toys, home appliances, tools and
dispensers are all included under the scope of the EU RoHS Directive, only certain
components of these types of products, when sold separately, are subject to China RoHS
compliance.192 It is important to note that products destined for export are not covered by
the China RoHS.193  As such, the primary foreign actors affected by the legislation are
those who import electronic goods into China and those who manufacture in China, for
the Chinese consumer market.
A major point of difference between the Chinese and European laws is that under the EU
RoHS Directive, only the company placing the product on the market is responsible for
compliance, where as the China RoHS binds producers, importers, retailers and all other
actors involved in production, sale and import of EEE.194 Their responsibilities, as laid
out by the China RoHS policy, include labeling restrictions, information disclosure
requirements and pre-market compliance testing and certification.195 The EU policy does
not create similar obligations. Another major difference between the laws is that while
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the long-term goal of the China RoHS may be to limit and eventually restrict the use of
hazardous substances, it appears that the short-term policy objective remains establishing
transparency throughout the production chain, with respect to the presence of toxic
substances.
In March 2009, China complemented its RoHS legislation with the adoption of its first
WEEE legislation, which is expected to take effect on 1 January 2011. The China
WEEE196 - which is also based on the principle of extended producer responsibility -
takes a significantly different approach from the European WEEE Directive.  Essentially,
the Chinese national legislation attempts to control the recovery (collection) and disposal
of WEEE products, the scope of which is to be defined in a forthcoming catalogue.197
Article 2 of the China WEEE defines the term disposal as including disassembly,
extraction of substances, alteration of physical or chemical properties, reduction or
elimination of hazardous substances, and landfilling. As such, the law attempts to
regulate all treatment possibilities for post-consumer WEEE. However, the
reconditioning and maintenance of products and the subsequent use of these products are
activities that do not fall within the regulatory scope.
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The China WEEE implements a management system based on recovery through multiple
channels and centralized disposal.198 It establishes a system of certification for disposing
enterprises and prohibits all other individuals and entities from engaging in WEEE
treatment.199 The major objective of the China WEEE, which is to regulate disposing
enterprises, is reflective of the main pollution concern related to WEEE in China:
dangerous recycling carried out by the informal sector. The permit system introduced by
the new legislation appears to be a strategy to formalize the largely illegal WEEE
handling sector, and to ensure that all future WEEE disposal conforms to environmental
and labour safety standards. The legislation stresses that all actors involved in WEEE
recovery, storage, transport, or disposal are subject to national laws regarding
environmental protection and environmental hygiene administration.200 Greater
transparency and information sharing in WEEE management are also called upon, as
responsibilities of qualified disposing enterprises include the establishment of a WEEE
monitoring system and an information data management system.201 The new legislation
also creates economic incentives for proper WEEE disposal, providing an “asset write-
off” to government agencies, social organizations, enterprises and institutions that deliver
WEEE to disposing enterprises, and entitling the latter to preferential tax treatment.202
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While the China WEEE is clear in mandating only qualified disposal enterprises to
engage in WEEE disposal, it is less straightforward with respect to the allocation of
responsibility for the recovery (collection) of post-consumer electronics. Enforcing what
may be viewed as a soft version of the extended producer responsibility (EPR) principle,
the China WEEE “encourages” manufacturers to collect WEEE independently or through
their distributors, repair organs, or other entities that engage in WEEE recovery, without
however, legally obliging them to do so.203  In fact EEE manufacturers’ and importers’
legal responsibilities under the China WEEE appear to be fairly minimal, their
obligations being restricted to the application of environmentally-sound designs,
information disclosure regarding toxic components and product recyclability, and
contribution to a government-administered special fund for WEEE disposal.204 Rules for
the collection, administration and use of the fund have yet to be established.
The China WEEE does not appear to specifically appoint WEEE recovery to any entity.
Article 11 requires retailers, distributors and other sellers of EEE to provide WEEE
collection-points, without going into further detail. Besides encouraging manufacturers
and importers to recover WEEE, the law requires those who engage in recovery to
provide “convenient and efficient recovery services to users of electric and electronic
products”205 but provides no further insight into the matter. This approach contrasts
sharply with the European WEEE approach, where producers are deemed responsible for
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the collection and treatment of their own new products. Failure of the China WEEE
legislation to incorporate a similar strategy may gravely hinder effectiveness of the newly
adopted law, in particular because there seems to be no incentive for manufacturers or
importers to assume individual responsibility with regards to waste from their own
products. Furthermore, it remains unclear how the assumption of individual responsibility
by a manufacturer would affect the latter’s exemption from, or contribution and access to,
the special fund for WEEE disposal. The fund itself raises many governance issues,
particularly with respect to transparency, misuse and corruption. Surely the existence of a
fund might ensure part of the financing that is needed for a modern, nation-wide, WEEE
disposal infrastructure, but there remains a great deal of uncertainty as to the relationship
of the fund with other EEE market actors.
With regard to measures for non-compliance, the China WEEE implements various
monetary fines on disposing enterprises who fail to meet their obligations. Similarly, EEE
manufacturers and importers may be imposed a fine for not fulfilling their information
disclosure requirements. However, the law provides no punitive measures with respect to
non-compliance of obligations related to WEEE recovery. As such, there seem to be no
financial or other consequences for manufacturers and importers of EEE that choose not
to engage in WEEE recovery. Making only vague references to the WEEE recovery
responsibilities of manufacturers, importers and other EEE sellers, the China WEEE law
does not substantially address what has emerged as one of the major challenges of WEEE
management in China, that is for manufacturers and importers, or legitimate recyclers to
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obtain WEEE before it is recuperated by the large and unregulated informal recovery
sector.206
The China WEEE law does not oblige consumers to return WEEE to producers, sellers or
qualified disposing enterprises. At the same time, the law does not restrict individuals or
businesses from engaging in WEEE collection, nor does it establish a certification system
for WEEE collection. This uncontrolled WEEE recovery system that is open to various
unregulated actors is evidently disadvantageous to manufacturers, importers and recyclers
that are subject to the WEEE law, as the extensive costs they must assume for
environmentally sound WEEE processing render them uncompetitive with informal
sector actors who operate outside environmental and labour norms, and are thus able to
offer consumers a higher price for WEEE. It is interesting to note that in both the EU and
China, one of the main challenges faced by EEE manufacturers, distributors and other
sellers, is that they must compete with other actors to obtain WEEE. Both regions need to
strengthen their efforts vis-a-vis the creation of incentives for consumers to discard their
used electronics through regulated channels.
In summary, it can be said that the new China WEEE legislation mainly attempts to
regulate the WEEE recycling sector, by banning all unauthorized WEEE disposal
operations. Given the extent of the problem of illegal and substandard WEEE processing
in China, this approach to WEEE management, in which improving the environmental
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performance of WEEE recyclers is prioritized, can be understood. However, the
legislation contains major gaps with respect to WEEE recovery, ultimately failing to
provide an accountable, coherent system for the collection of WEEE.
The new law encourages multistakeholder partnership and long-term cooperation for
WEEE recovery and disposal,207 without including all relevant actors in such processes.
In particular, consumers seem to be completely disregarded by the China WEEE law.
This exclusion of consumer participation in e-waste management creates an obstacle to
the establishment of an environmentally-sound national WEEE processing system, as it
does not account for the fact that consumers significantly impact the WEEE industry as
well as human health and the environment, in how they choose to discard their used
electronics. Unfortunately in China, there is a general lack of environmental awareness
among consumers regarding the potential harms of WEEE and a profit-making attitude
towards used electronics,208 factors that are likely to continue hindering the development
of environmentally-sound e-waste treatment systems despite the new WEEE legal
framework. In this respect, Chinese regulators may benefit from applying the European
WEEE approach, notably, by adopting measures to strengthen consumer participation and
awareness. Since the Chinese WEEE legislative framework has yet to define its product
scope, and evidently does not provide many of the features of the EU WEEE Directive,
such as ‘at least free of charge’ collection, obligatory manufacturer take-back schemes,
recovery and recycling targets, or even WEEE labeling requirements, it is currently
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impossible to assess how the China WEEE legislation will impact the electronics
industry, and whether it will have any effect whatsoever on Chinese consumers.
III. Other Asian Policies on WEEE and RoHS
Comparing regional approaches to e-waste management, the lack of harmonization
experienced in the EU affects Asia as well.  The longest standing e-waste regime in Asia
is that of Japan, where an obligatory manufacturer take-back scheme for a limited range
of electronic products was established by the Home Appliances Recycling Law
(HARL)209 in 2001. Since 1998, the Japanese electronics industry has actively and
voluntary promoted lead-free manufacturing and the phasing out of other toxic
substances.210 In 2006, Japan passed RoHS legislation211 which addresses the same six
hazardous substances as the EU Directive. Unlike the EU Directive however, the Japan
RoHS does not ban manufacturers or importers from selling EEE containing the
hazardous substances, instead, it imposes different labeling and information disclosure
requirements for products that exceed the allowable limits of those hazardous substances.
In this respect it is closer to the China RoHS. Still, the Chinese and Japanese approaches
are vastly different, with the Japan RoHS covering only eight consumer electronics,
namely, televisions, computers, refrigerators, air conditioners, copiers, washers, dryers
and microwaves. The Japanese RoHS experience to date has shown that even information
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sharing regarding toxic substances in EEE can be problematic for producers, as
information on hazardous materials is often lost at the component-manufacturing phase,
and there is overall “low reliability of information in the supply chain.”212
The South Korean approach to e-waste management stands out among other Asian
policies, by setting recycling targets and take-back schemes for EEE, similar to the
European WEEE Directive.213 With Thailand having recently developed voluntary RoHS
standards, and Taiwan also expected to adopt its own legislation in the near future, Asian
nations are showing a growing trend towards the cleaner production of electronics and
greater recognition of the need to address e-waste through product design policy. In
contrast, the United States and Canada have adopted no national WEEE or RoHS
legislation. The approach to e-waste management in both the United States and Canada
have been mainly industry-driven, albeit with an increasing number of local
municipalities coming out with mandatory recycling or substance-banning legislation.
IV. State-level E-waste Laws in the U.S.
The common approach to e-waste management in many U.S. jurisdictions is still the end-
of-life fee, whereby consumers who wish to dispose their products are charged a fee by
                                                 
212 Bengtsson, M., Hayashi, S., Totoki, Y., Enhanced Information Exchange on Hazardous
Substances in Electronics : Connecting the Production and End-of-life Phases (Institute for
Global Environmental Strategies, February 2009).
213 Act for Resource Recycling of Electrical and Electronic Products and Automobiles, Ministry
of Environment, Republic of Korea, February 2006.
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collectors who treat the waste either by themselves or by subsequently exporting it.214
This approach imposes no obligations on the manufacturers of toxic e-wastes, and the
probability of an item being recycled becomes entirely dependent on consumer “attitudes,
costs and convenience.”215 As such, e-waste recycling is rendered unpredictable and its
accessibility is presumably limited to individuals and businesses with adequate financial
resources and a certain level of environmental awareness.  Offering no long-term vision
or coherent collection and treatment infrastructure, this essentially constitutes a laissez-
faire model to e-waste management which leaves many toxic e-wastes uncontrolled, and
their final destinations unknown. Several U.S. States have adopted a more progressive
approach to WEEE management, having imposed landfill bans on e-wastes, mandatory
producer take-back schemes and in the case of California, even RoHS legislation. Still, at
the time of writing, an estimated 46.1% of the United States population remain uncovered
by State-level e-waste regulation.216
The first State to pass RoHS legislation was California. The Electronic Waste Recycling
Act217  (EWRA) obliges manufacturers to reduce hazardous substances in certain
electronic products and imposes an electronic waste recycling fee at point-of-purchase,
which is subsequently allocated to qualified recycling entities. The California law is
                                                 
214 Kutz, J., “You’ve Got Waste: The Exponentially Escalating Problem of Hazardous e-Waste”
(2006) 17 Villanova Environmental Law Journal, 307 – 330.
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216 See National Electronics Recycling Infrastructure Clearinghouse, “Overview of States with
Laws”, web resource available at http://
www.electronicsrecycling.org/public/UserDocuments/US%20Map%20of%20E%20Waste%20La
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similar to the EU RoHS Directive, except it bans the use of only four of the six
substances (lead, cadmium, mercury and hexavalent chromium) and applies to a narrower
range of goods. It is important to note that the legal restriction on hazardous substances
also applies to purchases made by telephone or internet, through out-of-state retailers.218
The California e-waste legislation is based on the advanced recycling fee approach
(ARF), as opposed to the principle of extended producer responsibility. Regulation takes
place at the retail level, where recycling fees are paid by the consumer at point-of-
purchase. Local governments are then responsible for collecting and handling e-wastes at
end-of-life. Manufacturers are affected by the State-level legislative initiatives in that
they now have to restrict using hazardous substances in certain electronics and provide
consumers, businesses and government authorities with information regarding the
environmental impact of their products. However, they are not obliged to participate in
product recycling, or to contribute financial or other resources in this regard. This type of
legislative framework clearly limits industry participation in e-waste management.
Ultimately, producers are less inclined to invest in the research and development of
WEEE treatment technologies, as no economic incentives are attached to engagement in
the post-use phase of electronics.
California’s e-waste legislation certainly transfers a higher degree of environmental
responsibility to retailers, consumers and municipalities with respect to e-waste
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management, and to EEE producers in the phasing out of hazardous substances in
manufacturing. It must be pointed out though, that the advanced recycling fee approach
does not seem to engage producers to the same extent as an EPR-based system would.
The other 18 States and one municipality (New York City) in the United States to have
adopted e-waste laws to date, have all opted for EPR-based schemes.219
While the adoption of e-waste legislation is necessary to protect human and
environmental health and to establish sustainable patterns of production and
consumption, the prospective proliferation of diverging WEEE and RoHS State-level
legislations throughout the United States will undoubtedly complicate compliance for
manufacturers, creating extensive financial and administrative burdens similar to the
situation in the EU. Additionally, given that the U.S. is not a Party to the Basel
Convention, and that its export restrictions on hazardous wastes do not apply to WEEE
other than cathode ray tubes,220 it is relevant to ask how State-level policies imposing
mandatory recycling of used electronics will impact the common current practice of
WEEE export. With no federal legislation in place to prohibit U.S. recycling companies
from exporting WEEE, there is serious doubt as to whether the introduction of mandatory
recycling laws in individual States will lead to the environmentally sound treatment of e-
wastes, or whether the diversion of these wastes from U.S. landfills is merely likely to
aggravate the problem of WEEE export to nations where processing is cheaper. An
important legislative measure to have been adopted in California to address this problem
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is the restriction of electronic waste export to foreign countries.221 The export restriction
sets in place a procedure for notification and approval, similar to the Basel Convention.
Like the Basel Convention, electronic components exported for reuse or recycling are
excluded from the scope of the restriction.222 This important initiative undertaken by the
State of California to conform its e-waste management framework to current international
law, is regrettably undermined by the ease of waste collectors and recyclers to transfer
shipments to neighboring States that have less restrictive e-waste regulation. Fortunately
however, the U.S. may soon be establishing federal regulatory controls to control this
problem, through nation-wide RoHS and WEEE legislation. In May 2009, two legislative
proposals were made to the House of Representatives, namely the Environmental Design
of Electrical Equipment (EDEE) Act223 (hereinafter U.S. RoHS bill) and an Amendment
to the Solid Waste Disposal Act to restrict certain exports of electronic waste (hereinafter
U.S. WEEE bill).224
The U.S. RoHS bill regulates the same six substances as the EU RoHS Directive and sets
similar maximum allowable concentrations for these substances. However, restrictions
set by the U.S. RoHS bill are not nearly as far-reaching as those adopted by the EU, as
they apply strictly to ‘electro-industry products’ which are defined as
any product or equipment that is directly used to facilitate the transmission,
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distribution, or control of electricity, or that uses electrical power for arc welding,
lighting, signaling protection and communication, or medical imaging, or electrical
motors and generators.225
As such, major categories of WEEE controlled under the EU RoHS Directive, such as IT
equipment, toys, and sports and leisure equipment are excluded from the U.S. RoHS bill.
Unlike the EU WEEE Directive, the U.S. WEEE bill does not attempt to establish
producer responsibility in WEEE management, and establishes no financing obligations
with respect to e-waste collection or treatment. The objective of the bill is to prohibit the
export of restricted e-waste to non-OECD countries. Again, the scope of products
regulated is narrower than the EU product scope:
used personal computers, servers, monitors, televisions, other video display
products, printers, copiers, facsimile machines, video cassette recorders, digital
video disc players, video game systems, digital audio players, personal digital
assistants, telephones, image scanners, and other used electronic products the
[EPA] determines to be similar.226
The U.S. WEEE bill adopts the same approach as the Basel Convention, in allowing for
the export of used electronic equipment or parts for use, reuse, repair or refurbishment.227
However, the U.S. bill does not regulate these exports to the same degree as the Basel
Convention. The proposed legislation does set in place certain control measures to
prevent disguised WEEE exports, notably by requiring that the export not be prohibited
by the importing country, that it be made by an original equipment manufacturer, the
                                                 
225 U.S. RoHS bill, supra note 222. Section 4(f)1.
226 U.S. WEEE bill, supra note 223. Section 1.
227 Id.
109
latter’s contractual agent or “an entity that meets an independent standard as identified by
the Administrator”228 and that the exporter fulfill detailed notification and record keeping
obligations. However, a major weakness of the proposed bill is that U.S. exporters are not
obliged to provide contractual proof of the receiving facility’s consent to the shipment or
of its capacity to handle the projected shipment in an environmentally sound manner. As
a result of these important omissions, the proposed U.S. WEEE bill appears to legitimize
accountability-free export of used and broken electronics. By setting a standard lower
than the Basel Convention, it is unlikely that the proposed U.S. bill, if adopted, will
contribute significantly to mitigating harmful e-waste trade flows to developing nations.
V. Canadian Laws on E-Waste
The Canadian approach to e-waste management has primarily focused on producer
responsibility for products at end-of-life. At the national level, the Canadian Council of
Ministers of the Environment (CCME) has established guidelines in the form of Canada-
wide Principles for Electronics Product Stewardship and a list of Recommended E-Waste
Products229 in order to assist provincial jurisdictions in developing e-waste programs.
However, provincial engagement in e-waste management has been highly varied and
inconsistent.
To date, only five (5) Canadian provinces have adopted e-waste legislation, namely
Alberta, Ontario, Saskatechewan, Nova Scotia and British Columbia. The province of
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Alberta has put in place an e-waste regime in which a multistakeholder non-profit
association (the Alberta Recycling Management Authority) collects fees from
manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers, arranges drop-off and collection
points within the province and redistributes collected funds to authorized recyclers. The
Saskatchewan e-waste program is also based on advanced collection fees from
manufacturers, and also mandates administration of the collection and treatment fund to a
non-profit corporation established by industry actors. Anyone wishing to sell covered
electronics in the province is legally required to be part of a product management system.
In the province of Ontario, WEEE management has been delegated to Ontario Electronics
Stewardship (OES), a not-for-profit-organization established by manufacturers, retailers
and other industry stakeholders. The Ontario WEEE program is unique, in that
manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers and other sellers of EEE only assume
legal responsibilities (which include registration, reporting on EEE quantities supplied to
Ontario and financing end-of-life) once they have been notified by OES that they qualify
as stewards. Compliance is retroactive to the commencement of the program. Another
interesting feature of the Ontario program is that it is set to operate in phases. Currently,
phase 2 of the program is being developed with consultation from stakeholders, and is
expected to expand the current scope of products (televisions, computers, computer
accessories and faxes) to include IT equipment and audiovisual equipment.
E-waste systems in the provinces of British Columbia and Nova Scotia resemble that of
Ontario’s in that they also operate in phases and essentially require producers to develop
product stewardship plans. In Manitoba, e-waste legislation that was introduced in 2007
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is still pending. In Prince Edward Island, North West Territories, Nunavut, Yukon and
Newfoundland/Labrador, there are currently no laws regulating the disposal or recycling
of e-wastes.
The province of Quebec had been in a stakeholder consultation phase since 2003 and in
November of 2009, finally released a draft bill that imposes an extended producer
responsibility regime for a range of hazardous products, including certain electronics.230
The Draft Regulation respecting the recovery and reclamation of products by
enterprises231 extends product recovery and reclamation obligations to producers,
manufacturers, importers or other enterprises that market or introduce a designated
electronic product into Quebec. Companies can exempt themselves from having to
implement a recovery and reclamation program only if they are members of an
organization whose function is to implement or contribute financially to a recovery and
reclamation system for discarded products, under agreement with the provincial
government-run Société québécoise de récupération et de recyclage. The proposed
legislation requires that recovery and reclamation programs provide for and monitor the
management of designated electronic products according to best practices and standards,
establish collection points, include consumer environmental awareness campaigns and
contribute to research and development in treatment technologies. In addition, companies
are required to meet the specified target collection rates in the time frames prescribed, at
the risk of having to pay a fine to the Minister, and must also fulfill regular reporting
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duties. Considering the substantial administrative costs related to establishing a recovery
and reclamation system that would comply with the proposed regulation, it is likely that
most companies, at least small-scale businesses, will opt for the exemption and mandate
their responsibilities to a provincially-approved industry-led or multistakeholder
organization, as is the case in other Canadian provinces.
Regrettably, no Canadian province has taken the legal initiative to restrict toxic
substances from electronic products. The focus remains entirely on waste collection and
recycling, with little attention on the reduction of toxic e-waste generation or the
promotion of clean production.
VI. Observations on the International WEEE/RoHS Law Landscape
There are interesting observations to be drawn from the international comparison of
legislative measures that aim to control e-waste pollution, provided above. Firstly, almost
all legal initiatives targeting e-waste are based on the principle of extended producer
responsibility, and as such call upon manufacturers and other producers of EEE to
participate, at least financially, in electronic product lifecycle management. WEEE
regimes commonly founded on the EPR principle may diverge significantly, as a result of
the scope of actors that are legally defined as producers and the degree of responsibility
that is accorded to them with regards to financing and developing end-of-life
management schemes for their products. Since e-waste management schemes need to be
adapted to the industrial, social, political and environmental context of the particular
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geographic region they are meant to govern, some legal variation between them is
inevitable. However, certain elements appear to be fundamental to successful e-waste
governance and need to be applied in all regions where EPR programs have been
established.
1. Information Sharing & Participation
The first area where legislative improvement is needed on a global scale, is
environmental information sharing with regard to electronics use, disposal, collection and
treatment. As previously explained, one of the common challenges to e-waste
management in all regions where EEE is consumed, is that manufacturers and producers
must compete with other market actors, including well-organized and expansive informal
sectors, to collect end-of-life electronics. It was also pointed out earlier that the success of
environmentally sound WEEE recycling companies, in developed and developing
countries alike, relies on their ability to secure constant material flows for processing, a
factor which itself depends heavily on consumer behaviour, on the collection capacities
of the informal sector and on other circumstances beyond the control of recycling
companies and individual electronics manufacturers.
To solve the problem of e-waste being taken out of official, environmentally-safe
treatment streams, users, collectors and individual recyclers must be well-informed of
their individual responsibilities in the WEEE chain, and of the consequences related to
disposing or handling e-waste irresponsibly at the phase of the product cycle in which
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they are involved. E-waste policies should present all stakeholders in the WEEE chain
with incentives to direct e-wastes towards proper end-of-life treatment. Initiatives in this
regard should cover informal sector workers as well, as their integration into
environmentally-safe treatment streams is necessary for environmental protection and for
the sustainable economic and social development of their communities. In practice, this
could mean that developing countries create a system which utilizes the collection and
manual sorting expertise of their informal sectors, and mandates subsequent treatment to
authorized environmentally-safe recycling companies. Introducing this dimension to
WEEE policies would in effect interlock the interests of original manufacturers and
informal sector workers, actors who currently qualify as distant and opposing forces in
the WEEE chain. A pilot project in this regard has recently been launched in China232 and
its outcome will be highly relevant to India, Latin American countries, and other regions
where informal sector participation in WEEE management is omnipresent.
At all phases of the electronic product use, disposal and recovery chain, the dissemination
of information plays a key role in achieving sustainable governance. But placing
information responsibilities entirely on producers, as do many European countries’
WEEE regimes, may be an insufficient policy measure. Surely, the adoption and
expansion of producer responsibility regimes provide the electronics industry with the
economic motivation to develop new corporate strategies aimed at raising e-waste
awareness amongst consumers and diverting e-waste flows from unregulated collection
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and treatment, but this task should not be left to the private sector alone. In an
information-based global society, the proper use and disuse of technologies should be
seen as an essential element of contemporary citizenship, and constitute a priority area for
public governance. Environmental education and awareness about electronics use should
not be strictly provided to consumers and businesses, it should be made available to
individuals of all socio-economic levels and to all generations. In this respect, emergent,
community-based, public-private partnerships may be a highly effective means to further
sustainable EEE production and consumption goals, instead of relying exclusively on
manufacturers’ to educate users about their own products.  Considering that electronics
consumption is inescapable and deeply embedded in daily human life, public education
systems should be designed to teach responsible e-consumerism, which in most basic
terms can be defined as purchasing electronic products that have been produced and will
be recycled in accordance with international environmental and human rights norms.
Municipalities could adopt e-consumer councils, which would be transdisciplinary,
multistakeholder advisory boards responsible for holding social forums on emerging e-
waste issues and for informing the public of sustainably-developed electronic products
and services.  These types of initiatives are important for all countries, irrespective of
their level of economic development.
2. Multistakeholder Coordination: Mapping the Responsibilities of Non-producers
A second WEEE issue that merits greater global attention relates to the need for deeper
recognition of the financial interest and environmental role of e-waste brokers, recyclers
and other non-producer actors involved in the WEEE chain. The current legislative
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frameworks of several countries that I have examined do not acknowledge the highly
competitive market that exists for WEEE, nor do they provide effective mechanisms for
producers to access WEEE before it enters unregulated recycling channels. This holds
true for both developed and developing nations. In this respect, it is in the best interest of
consumers and manufacturers that comprehensive regulatory frameworks for the
monitoring of recycling industries be established. Incentives for environmentally sound
recycling should be created and mechanisms for greater transparency and corporate
responsibility in the recycling sector should be introduced worldwide.
3. Global Adoption of RoHS
My analysis of national RoHS initiatives shows three distinct policy models emerging: no
action being taken in this regard, the development of voluntary compliance codes or
standards, and the adoption of national legislation either prohibiting the use of hazardous
substances or creating stricter labeling and information requirements for electronics in
which hazardous substances are present. Of these three national approaches, taking no
action is clearly the least progressive for a nation, as its domestic industries will not
remain competitive in the global market. Furthermore, nations who choose not to adopt
RoHS policies slow down the global standardization of green design and clean
production, reinforcing instead unsustainable patterns of electronics manufacturing that
are known to raise the hazards and costs of recycling processes, and to be harmful to
human and environmental health. As such, the adoption of national RoHS measures
should be treated as an essential dimension of sustainable e-waste governance. However,
discordance between national or regional RoHS policies, in terms of the scope of
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products or substances covered by them, may present significant financial and technical
challenges to EEE producers and other actors in the supply chain. In particular, it may be
especially difficult for small and medium sized enterprises (SME’s) to comply with
various RoHS regulations, as they may not have the resources and expertise of global
manufacturers to access reliable and affordable replacement materials, or even to access
information on new environmental standards. SME’s in Asia who are typically contracted
out by international brand-owners to manufacture electronic components may find their
market access blocked by the emerging RoHS requirements of international markets.
To address these potentially trade-disrupting implications of new RoHS regulations,
governments, international brand-owners and industry associations should provide
capacity building programmes, information seminars, and other forms of technical and
financial cooperation to assist EEE supply chain actors in meeting domestic and foreign
environmental requirements. Ultimately, the harmonization of RoHS requirements
through the development of global standards may be the most cost-efficient way to assist
the electronics industry in its transition to clean production.
CONCLUSION
The continually escalating use of electronics containing both toxic substances and
precious metals has brought upon a global human and environmental health crisis. In the
absence of effective regulation, e-waste trading towards developing countries has evolved
into a lucrative transnational business, offering employment opportunities and satisfying
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the overwhelming demand for secondary raw materials that exists in manufacturing-
oriented developing economies. At the same time, the conditions in which e-waste
processing has commonly taken place in these countries, has gravely deteriorated the
local environment and substantially affected human health.
Aware of the risks posed by increasing quantities of e-waste, the international community
has attempted to ban e-waste imports into developing countries, through the Basel
Convention ban amendment, which currently remains unenforced, due to a lack of
sufficient ratifications. Debate over the Basel ban’s possible curtailment of international
trade in recyclables, and especially its implications for legitimate recycling operations in
developing economies, has shifted international political attention away from the
question of ratification and towards assisting developing economies in adopting
environmentally-sound e-waste management systems. In addition, it has become evident,
in particular through the pioneering legislative efforts of the European Union, that the
promotion of sustainable e-waste management and capacity-building in developing
countries must be coupled with worldwide action aimed at minimizing e-waste
generation, holding producers responsible for the end-of-life management of their
products and phasing out the use of toxic substances in electronic product design. As
shown by this thesis however, legislative action in this regard has been highly varied.
Only the EU, Japan, California, South Korea and China have enacted RoHS legislation
geared at making electronic waste and its recycling less harmful to human and
environmental health. In addition, some countries have either ratified the Basel ban
amendment, or adopted their own policies prohibiting the export or import of electronic
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wastes. Meanwhile, existing loopholes in U.S. and Canadian federal export policies
continue to allow the transfer of e-waste into developing countries, against provisions of
the Basel Convention. Not only has their lack of regulation decreased transparency and
accountability in international e-waste flows, it has also aggravated transboundary
pollution and contributed to the proliferation of indecent e-waste recycling jobs in
developing countries. Furthermore, a pattern of cyclical contamination has emerged,
whereby toxic substances derived from improperly treated e-waste exports have re-
infiltrated the global market in the form of new products.233
My examination of national responses to the WEEE crisis revealed that the principle of
extended producer responsibility has provided the basis for e-waste regimes in most
countries. Increasingly, producers and other EEE sellers are being held responsible for
the collection and treatment of their products, either individually or collectively.
Together, EPR and RoHS measures are pushing environmental and public health to the
forefront of manufacturers’ concerns, even determining what products succeed in the
international market.
Reflecting the growing importance of environmental performance and corporate social
responsibility for the electronics industry, global computer manufacturer Dell recently
published its Electronics Disposition Policy, through which the company bans all export
of e-waste (defined by the company as all non-working parts or devices) to developing
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countries. To ensure that the recycling companies with which it contracts do not infringe
its global policy for responsible electronics disposal, Dell has put in place a monitoring
system to audit individual recyclers and to monitor WEEE treatment at the sub-
contracting level as well. Dell is the first EEE manufacturer to develop a policy that
actually imposes a standard higher than the Basel Convention, by strictly limiting the
exemption on exports to functioning electronics. It is very likely that Dell’s policy will
provide competitive pressure on other global EEE manufacturers to adopt similar or even
stricter environmental policies in the near future. However, industry-led voluntary
initiatives are not sufficient measures in themselves to control WEEE pollution, as only
an environmental legislative framework can influence reluctant companies to assume
lifecycle responsibility for their products. Additionally, adjustment policies, financial
assistance and capacity-building may be necessary for small and medium scale
manufacturers to reach the same levels of environmental performance as global
producers.
Even State-level EPR programs and RoHS requirements on their own, are not an
adequate solution to the problems of e-waste generation and treatment, as patchwork
policies create substantial financial and technical obstacles for producers wishing to seek
compliance for multiple markets. Furthermore, because these policies are most likely to
have been developed without consultation from international stakeholders, they may be
insensitive to their external effects and their implications for global trade and
development. Ultimately, there is a need to develop infrastructure at a global scale, with
the collaboration of all relevant stakeholders. In this regard, new supranational public-
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private partnership initiatives such as the United Nations’ Solve the E-Waste Problem
(StEP) and the Secretariat of the Basel Convention’s Partnership for Action on
Computing Equipment (PACE), which draw upon international multidisciplinary
scientific knowledge, technical expertise and financial resources, are invaluable global
platforms for information exchange and discussion, for research and development, and
for providing insight into how, as an international community, we can achieve
sustainability in our use, disuse and disposal of electronics.
These types of global initiatives help us to recall that shifting to producer responsibility is
only a part of the e-waste solution. With “pervasive computing”234 pushing the ecosystem
to its outer limits, in terms of natural resource extraction and toxic waste accumulation, a
simple re-organization of the channels through which we manage electronic waste is not
sufficient to protect environmental and human health. Above all, what is required is
deeper understanding of the meaning and scope of sustainable production and
consumption (SCP), a concept recognized by the international community as an
overarching link between the challenges of environmental protection and global
development:
The major cause of the continued deterioration of the global environment are the
unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, particularly in industrialised
countries, which is a matter of grave concern, aggravating poverty and imbalances.
Developed countries should take the lead in achieving sustainable consumption patterns…
 (Agenda 21 (Chap. 4.3), Earth Summit, Rio 1992)
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To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States
should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and
promote appropriate demographic policies.
(Principle 8, Rio Declaration)
While there is no legal definition of SCP, its objective is understood as the de-association
of economic growth and environmental degradation through the optimization of resource
use during all phases of product lifecycles, and maintenance of “energy, material and
pollution intensity of all production and consumption functions within the carrying and
assimilating capacities of natural ecosystems.”235
To date, environmental policies regarding e-wastes have mainly focused on waste
management and clean production. Sustainable consumption has mostly been viewed as
an extension of sustainable production, as the choice to consume responsibly, and rarely
has it been legally addressed in any other context. The right to consume is a complex
realm to legislate, as it remains intimately linked with personal freedom, living standards,
lifestyles and cultural values, which fluctuate enormously within and between societies.
Nevertheless, it is becoming crucial to address the boundaries of consumption, as
contemporary living standards and consumer behaviour patterns are not always reflective
of an environmentally acceptable quality of life. With consumers’ choice of electronics
impacting so profoundly on the quality of life of neighboring populations and future
generations, as well as affecting resource extraction and preservation, the global
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community needs to build an environmental framework for consumption. This does not
necessarily imply restricting consumer rights, instead, it can be conceptualized as the
right of the consumer to safe goods and post-consumption services, in conditions which
allow the reduction of environmental hazards, an optimization of the use of resources and
full respect of international human and labour rights. Governments play a crucial role in
this respect, as they are uniquely responsible for designating the social and environmental
limits of private sector activities.
In the world of electronic commodities, greater consumer demand, along with the use of
toxic substances and harmful recycling flows, have brought upon an environmental crisis
that cannot be solved entirely through trade restrictions and clean production, but requires
in-depth analysis of the cultural and functional role of electronic commodities in modern
daily life. The scarcity of geochemical resources and rising toxic pollution are new
challenges faced by global businesses and consumers, environmental realities that force
us to reconsider our current industrial models.  While it is certain that technologies have
propelled human development, they have also significantly shifted our relationship with
the environment and transformed human reality into a network of information-oriented
societies interlinked through complex production and consumption processes. The new
human habitat is a globalized urbanism, and even though its roots and success are deeply
tied in the exploitation of natural resources and labour, and in the proliferation of
chemical production and consumption, the contemporary technological lifestyle must
somehow be re-harmonized with nature, otherwise its collective effects on a global scale
are deemed to be catastrophic.
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